The order of the Appellate Division should be REVERSED, and the dismissed counts of the indictment reinstated.
When the prosecutor had completed his charge, one of the grand jurors asked for clarification of the term “reasonably believes.” The prosecutor responded by instructing the grand jurors that they were to consider the circumstances of the incident and determine “whether the defendant’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in the defendant’s situation.” It is this response by the prosecutor-and specifically his use of “a reasonable man”-which is the basis for the dismissal of the charges by the lower courts. As expressed repeatedly in the Appellate Division’s plurality opinion, because section 35 .15 uses the term “he reasonably believes,” the appropriate test, according to that court, is whether a defendant’s beliefs and reactions were “reasonable to him.”
Under that reading of the statute, a jury which believed a defendant’s testimony that he felt that his own actions were warranted and were reasonable would have to acquit him, regardless of what anyone else in defendant’s situation might have concluded. Such an interpretation defies the ordinary meaning and significance of the term “reasonably” in a statute, and misconstrues the clear intent of the Legislature, in enacting section 35.15, to retain an objective element as part of any provision authorizing the use of deadly physical force.
Penal statutes in New York have long codified the right recognized at common law to use deadly physical force, under appropriate circumstances, in selfdefense. These provisions have never required that an actor’s belief as to the intention of another person to inflict serious injury be correct in order for the use of deadly force to be justified, but they have uniformly required that the belief comport with an objective notion of reasonableness [ emphasis added] …. plurality below agreed with defendant’s argument that the change in the statutory language from “reasonable ground,” used prior to 1965, to “he reasonably believes” in Penal Law ยง 35.15 evinced a legislative intent to conform to the subjective standard.
We cannot lightly impute to the Legislature an intent to fundamentally alter the principles of justification to allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To completely exonerate such an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their own standards for the permissible use of force. It would also allow a legally competent defendant suffering from delusions to kill or perform acts of violence with impunity, contrary to fundamental principles of justice and criminal law.
We can only conclude that the Legislature retained a reasonableness requirement to avoid giving a license for such actions. Statutes or rules of law requiring a person to act “reasonably” or to have a “reasonable belief” uniformly prescribe conduct meeting an objective standard measured with reference to how “a reasonable person” could have acted.
Goetz argues that the introduction of an objective element will preclude a jury from considering factors such as the prior experiences of a given actor and thus require it to make a determination of “reasonableness” without regard to the actual circumstances of a particular incident. This argument, however, falsely presupposes that an objective standard means that the background and other relevant characteristics of a particular actor must be ignored. To the contrary, we have frequently noted that a determination of reasonableness must be based on the “circumstances” facing a defendant or his “situation.” Such terms encompass more than the physical movements of the potential assailant.
As just discussed, these terms include any relevant knowledge the defendant had about that person. They also necessarily bring in the physical attributes of all persons involved, including the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s circumstances encompass any prior experiences he had which could provide a reasonable basis for a belief that another person’s intentions were to injure or rob him or that the use of deadly force was necessary under the circumstances.
Accordingly, a jury should be instructed to consider this type of evidence in weighing the defendant’s actions. The jury must first determine whether the defendant had the requisite beliefs under section 35.15, that is, whether he believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of one of the felonies enumerated therein. If the People do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not have such beliefs, then the jury must also consider whether these beliefs were reasonable. The jury would have to determine, in light of all the “circumstances,” as explicated above, if a reasonable person could have had these beliefs.
The prosecutor’s instruction to the second Grand Jury that it had to determine whether, under the circumstances, Goetz’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in his situation was thus essentially an accurate charge.
The order of the Appellate Division should be REVERSED, and the dismissed counts of the indictment reinstated.