Was Dixon right to procedural due process violated by a constructive discharge by the NRPD?
TITLE AND CITATION: Silva v. Bieluch, Sheriff of Palm Beach County & Eggleston, Undersheriff of Palm Beach County, 351 F.3d 1045 United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, (Nov. 25, 2003) TYPE OF ACTION: Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals to review an alleged violation of Due Rights process incurred after deputies were demoted from their probationary positions as Lieutenants after the claim was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. FACTS OF THE CASE:
Deputy Sheriff’s filed suit against the newly elected Sheriff Bieluch and Undersheriff Eggleston after they were transferred from their probationary roles as lieutenants back to their previous positions. The Deputies were filling probationary roles and were noted by the newly appointed Sheriff as having campaigned in support of the Sheriff’s opposition.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: Deputy Sheriff Silva contends that the newly appointed Sheriff’s unlawfully demoted them from their probationary roles as Lieutenants as a result of politically campaigning for the new Sheriff’s opposition and was in violation of the parties due rights process. Upon Dismissal of the case by the District Court, the Plaintiff filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. ISSUE: The issue is that the deputy Sheriff’s believe the new Sheriff cannot legally demote them and believe bias was involved because they campaigned against the newly appointed sheriff. The deputy sheriff believes their demotions clearly violated their due process rights because no trial or reasoning was provided by the Sheriff for their demotions from their probationary roles.
DECISION: The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the deputies failed to state nor could they substantiate a claim under the First Amendment against the new sheriff and that the deputies could not identify a substantive due process violation claim resulting from their loss of rank. Procedurally, the Court of Appeals denied the Plaintiff the right to amend the appeal to help substantiate evidence of Due Rights violation because the Court failed to see enough evidence to believe an amendment would satisfy the claim REASONING: Although the plaintiff is entitled an opportunity to amend his appeal before having it dismissed, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate an amendment to support the due rights violation. Furthermore, because the deputies held probationary roles as lieutenants, the Sheriff can legally demote them while in the probationary period because the deputies had not fulfilled the obligatory time requirements.
RULE OF LAW: Under Constitutional Law, a sheriff can demote on the basis of political patronage, in this case the sheriff saw fit to demote the deputies because they did not support the Sheriff. Accordingly, “Stigma Plus” protects individuals from deformation; however, the plaintiff failed to identify any violations to due rights. Finally, the deputies had no right to the rank of Lieutenant until having filled the one year probationary period.
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Due Process – Procedural:
Title and citation
Dixon v. City of New Richmond, 334 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003)
Type of Action
Review by the court on whether an employee can seek redress when dismissed from employment as a matter of cause rather than the legal grounds upon which an employee has a right, as under the law, to constructively dismiss an employee. The plaintiff sought a civil interpretation of the law, on whether there had been violations of his rights by his employers, and the grounds for redress.
Facts of the case
Dixon had been a police officer since 1998, working part-time with the NRPD and the Police Department of Village Somerset. In May 1998, he became a full-time police officer with Somerset Police but worked part-time with the NRPD. The legal implication of working part-time with the NRPD was that he would be working on a needs basis. The Chief of Police of NRPD was in charge of all decisions concerning staff, assignment of shifts, the work to be done and the way the departments would share the work. Dixon was charged with employment violation of the alcoholic and beverages provisions, the falsification, and theft of evidence, among other issues in January 2001. Dixon notified NRPD and agreed that there would be no disciplinary action that would be taken against Dixon until the case at Somerset had been completed and decided. The Chief of Police retired at NRPD, and a new chief came and was thus informed of the situation with Dixon. In February 2001, Dixon was found culpable of some of the accusations and summarily dismissed from the Somerset Police. The new chief at NRPD issued credentials to all police officers except Dixon, and in October 2001, asked Dixon to file his credentials, to which Dixon did not comply. Dixon had filed an appeal against his conviction at Somerset Police, and it was not until February 12, 2002, that the court said that he was indeed culpable. The chief of police at NRPD told Dixon that an internal review on the Somerset Police dismissal would be conducted, and then he would be given way forward. He did not attend the agreed meetings to give a version of the case, and thus he was discharged by the NRPD. It is this that made him move to court for what he termed as violation of his employment rights, which the court agreed that there were indeed grounds for his dismissal.
Contentions of the parties
Dixon: he argues that by the dismissal, the NRPD had violated his protected property interests, because of his employment, and that the due process had not been followed in his dismissal. The order to return his credentials amounted to a dismissal, which was not legally warranted.
NRPD: the argument is that while it does not dispute that Dixon had protected property interest, as an employer, it was free to determine how the staff would be assigned, and their terms of employment. As such, Dixon was not denied any privileges as a part-time police officer and was only denied shifts because of the case he was facing at Somerset, which when concluded led to his summary dismissal.
Issues
Were Dixon’s rights for protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment violated by NRPD because of his dismissal?
Reasoning
The court argued that the legal threshold for dismissal had not been proven. The NRPD, at Dixon’s request, withheld any disciplinary action until the case at Somerset had been concluded. It also argued on the discretion of the employer in this case to make staffing decisions, which the NRPD conducted, and did not allocate Dixon any shifts until the case he was facing at Somerset had been concluded. The four grounds of deprivation of the protected property interest were also not proven.
The rule of law
An employer can still have the right to dismiss an employee, even with the protected property interest. All they need is to show that the due process is followed in arriving at their decision since the court affirmed the decision by NRPD.
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Title and Citation: Dixon v. City of New Richmond, 334 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003)
Type of Action:
An appeal of termination stating the loss of employment was based on constructive discharge which violated the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (procedural).
Facts of the Case:
James Dixon was a full-time officer with the Somerset Police Department in 1998 and a part-time officer with the North Hudson Police Department, NRPD, during that same year. The two positions between the agencies varied because his part-time status at NRPD relied on Chief Levi’s executive decision to place any officer on the schedule on an as-needed basis. Therefore, an officer may or may not work depending on the need and the availability to work. While Dixon was employed at both agencies in early 2001, numerous complaints against him arose at Somerset PD citing alcoholic beverage law violations, falsifying time sheets, and theft of evidence. Dixon sought council, who in turn contacted the NRPD and requested a delay in judgment again his client until it concluded. Chief Levi agreed to these terms; however, informed the attorney that Dixon would not be placed on the schedule until this conclusion.
In February 2001, the Somerset Review Board unanimously decided that Dixon committed the acts filed against him except the beverage law and terminated his employment with the Somerset PD. Dixon filed an appeal shortly after that. A couple of months later in June 2001, NRPD Chief Levi retired, and Chief Samelstad took over; however, before leaving, Levi informed Samelstad of the agreement with Dixon’s attorney about any disciplinary action. Samelstad complied and kept Dixon on as an employee, however, he would not receive the new credentials. In December of that year, the circuit court upheld Somerset’s decision to terminate Dixon.
Because the Somerset issue was now completed, NRPD conducted an internal investigation concerning Dixon’s termination from Somerset. Dixon was given the opportunity to present his case to the NRPD and failed to show up to the meeting, and NRPD filed charges. Additionally, Dixon failed to attend a hearing resulting in his termination with the NRPD. In return, Dixon stated he had been constructively discharged from the NRPD because the NRPD had denied him due process of law by suspending, demoting, removing, or constructively discharging him back in January 2001 (Dixon, 2003).
Contentions of the Parties:
The City of Richmond argued that Dixon’s right to procedural due process was not violated because he was still considered until his discharge in May 2002. This non-violation was reaffirmed when Dixon’s attorney, Waterman, sent a letter to Chief Samelstad before the appeal, stating that Dixon still considered himself an employee and was willing to work part-time shifts.
Secondly, Dixon was given ample opportunities to present his case before the members of the Somerset Police Department’s Internal Affairs and attend a hearing, but Dixon chose not to show up to either.
Dixon argued that his Fourteenth Amendment right of procedural due process was violated because NRPD had constructively discharged him by not putting him on the schedule and issuing him new credentials.
Issue :
Was Dixon’s right to procedural due process violated by a constructive discharge by the NRPD?
Decisions:
No. According to Avery (2014), procedural due process refers to the process in which the government must abide by when taking life, liberty, or property from an individual or in this case, suspended, demoted, removed, or constructively discharged. Chief. Therefore, Dixon’s claim of constructive discharge from the NRPD was unfounded.
Reasoning:
The district court ruled that Dixon was not constructively discharged. In Green v. Brennan (195 L.Ed.2d 44), “constructive discharge” contemplates a situation where an employer discriminates against an employee to the point that working conditions become intolerable and the employee feels compelled to resign. And in return, the employee must prove the discrimination against the employer to the point any person in the same position would feel compelled to resign (Green, 2016). Because Dixon was still considered an employee of the NRPD and he was given numerous opportunities to state his case the court determined his rights were not violated.
Rule of Law:
Persons deny themselves procedural due process when they fail to present their case when given the opportunity. Furthermore, evidence of an intolerable work environment must exist to cite constructive discharge. In Dixon v. City of New Richmond, Dixon’s status with the NRPD was on hold, and he still retained employment until the Somerset issue was concluded. Secondly, Dixon expressed his desire to work part-time shifts with the NRPD after his termination with Somerset; therefore, the intolerable work environment does not apply (Dixon, 2003).