INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION
There are many incentives for employees to take advantage of the power associated with their position in an institutional setting. They range from struc tural and organizational characteristics of prison management to individual factors (e.g., honesty of staff, the financial needs of employees, etc.).
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2 7 6 JUSTICE, CRIME, AND ETHICS
A major incentive for corrupt practices results from defects in the prison organization’s control structure. The prison, which is essentially a coercive organization, formally bases its control on the use of coercive power (Etzioni, 1964:59). However, correctional employees, particularly line staff, find that there are limits to the degree of compliance achieved through the use of coercive power (Cloward, 1960; Sykes, 1958). In order to do the job successfully, coercive power must be supplemented with informal exchange relations with inmates. These informal control practices are utilized by staff for control purposes and are responsible for the smooth functioning of the institution and for maintaining an uneasy peace (Cloward, 1960; Irwin, 1980; Sykes, 1958). As Sykes pointed out more than 50 years ago:
The custodians (guards) … are under strong pressure to compro mise with their captives for it is a paradox that they can insure their dominance only by allowing it to be corrupted. Only by tolerating violations of minor rules and regulations can the guard secure compliance in the major areas of the custodial regime (1956:158).
According to Sykes, three factors are responsible for undermining the formal control structure of the prison: (I) friendships with inmates, (2) reciprocal relationships, and (3) defaults. Each of these factors develops at the linestaff level as a function of longterm and close working associations between guards and inmates in a close setting. Irwin (1980), in a contemporary update, cited corrupt favoritism as a significant factor in the daytoday management of the prison.
Corruption through friendship evolves from the close contact that pris oners and guards share in their daily interactions. In many cases, they get to know one another as individuals, and friendships may develop. These friend ships may, in turn, affect how staff members use their authority. Corruption through reciprocity occurs as an indirect consequence of the exchange rela tions that develop between inmates and staff: “You do something for me, I’ll do something for you.” Corruption through default occurs when staff mem bers (e.g., cellblock officers) begin to rely on inmates to assist them with their duties, such as report writing and cell checks. In time, the employee depends on the inmates for their assistance in satisfactorily performing his or her duties.
Cloward (1960) also pointed out how defects in the prison organization’s control apparatus lead staff members to develop informal means of control through the development of various accommodations between the keepers and the kept. Material accommodations occur when staff provide certain inmates with access to forbidden goods and services or contraband in return for their cooperation. Cloward provides an example of this when he quotes an inmate explaining how he makes home brew:
You go to make arrangements with the mess sergeant. He gets the ingredients and when we’re in business . . . it’s one of those you do this for me and 1’11 do this for you sort of thing. . . . The
sergeant has to feed 1,500 men. It don’t look good if he goofs. He wants the job done right. Now we’re the ones who do the work, the cooking and all of that. So the sergeant, he says, okay you can make a little drink. But see to it that you get that food on the lines or the deal’s off (1960:7).
Power accommodations occur when selected inmates are provided with access to restricted information, such as the date and time of an impending shakedown (search of cells) or access to key correctional personnel. Frequently, these take the form of reciprocal relationships in which valuable information is exchanged by both staff and inmates. Inmates inform on one another, and staff in turn may disclose administration plans regarding such activities as the time and place of cell searches.
Status accommodations result when staff provide special deference to certain inmates. According to Cloward:
The right guy … seems to be left alone (by staff) in spite of con spicuous deviance from official values, and this mark of untouch ability results in high status among his peers (1960:40).
The cumulative effect of these accommodations may predispose certain correctional employees to take advantage of their situation and attempt to materially benefit from their working relationships with inmates, staff, and contractors.
Another factor that complicates matters is the type and quality of persons recruited and hired to work in correctional facilities. Frequently the quality of the work force is uneven and sometimes substandard because of low pay and poor working conditions. These individuals are placed in situations in which they are given considerable discretionary authority (without much training in its use) in a setting in which the visibility of their actions is quite low. When this occurs, the probability of corrupt practices increases. Another factor that provides an incentive for corruption is the impact of politics. If the selection and promotion of employees are influenced by politics, employee decisions may benefit the political party in power.