Human service model of employee supervision:
A model that stresses employee ownership, delegation of authority, and the sharing of power within organizations.
Toch (1978) , as one of the first to comment on the traditional assumptions we hold about rank-and-file criminal justice workers, states the following:
· A correctional officer assigned to tower duty is a residue of the dark ages. He requires 20/20 vision, the IQ of an imbecile, a high threshold for boredom, and a basement position in Maslow’s hierarchy.
Similar views have also been offered about police officers (“street cops”) and their vitriolic attitudes toward administrators (“management cops”) ( Reuss-Ianni, 1984 ). The result of such a split is often hostility and a sense of separation between officer and manager. Such a split is directly related to the militarystyle organization found in most police departments ( Fyfe, 2004a : 158).
Such a view highlights the tension that is created between rank-and-file employees and administrators when assumptions about employees are less than flattering, and there is no appreciation of the diversity of their role and the job performed. The traditional model of police supervision does not recognize either the importance of this diversity or that organizational control—the single most important goal under the traditional model—is only one goal among many. It is this recognition of diversity in both personal and organizational goals that defines the human service model of employee supervision.
Within the context of a problem-oriented approach to police organization, Goldstein (1990 :149) argues that the traditional model of supervision must be supplanted with a model of supervision that fosters a “relationship with management built on mutual trust and on agreement that an officer has the freedom to think and act within broad boundaries.” Similarly, Johnson (2002) has shown that effective correctional officers are those who stretch the role of custody to include the delivery of goods and services to prisoners, even though there are very few inducements for such behavior. Why do some officers exhibit such behaviors? The answer to this question, offered by Johnson (2002 :256), serves to define the basic assumption of the human service model of employee supervision:
· Why, then, do some [correctional] officers persist in activities that take time and effort, are neither recognized nor rewarded by others, and must be hidden or played down for fear of trouble with administrators, peers, treatment staff, or recalcitrant inmates? The reason … is simply this: human service activities make the officer’s job richer, more rewarding, and ultimately less stressful.
Recognition of the true nature of the employee’s role enables managers and administrators to grasp that supervision must include a rather expansive definition of employee tasks and activities. Less centralization, fewer and more clearly defined rules, and less bureaucracy are central tenets of the human service model of employee supervision. Unlike the traditional model of employee supervision that emphasizes tight controls and limited decision making among employees, this approach stresses the importance of decentralization of authority for greater decision-making capabilities among lower-level members, fewer rules to encumber the enlarged activities of employees, and a breaking down of the traditional hierarchy found in most police and correctional organizations.
Such views are consistent with popular ideas expressed by contemporary management experts, such as Peters and Waterman (1982 :150), who stress autonomy and entrepreneurship (less centralization); simultaneous loose–tight properties (less formalization); and simple form, lean staff (less complexity). Such approaches have proven to be invaluable to the corporate world and have equal relevance to criminal justice administration and management. All are consistent with the human service model of employee supervision. Both experts and reformers alike have called for the application of these ideas in transforming the supervision process within criminal justice organizations (see Christopher Commission Report, 1991 :242–244).
In addition, the case for humanizing organizational structure has had its strongest support among researchers who investigate the importance of investing in people within organizations and organizational performance. O’Toole and Meier (2009) stress that an investment in people in organizations yields much return relative to cost. Their research, based on a review of evidence for hundreds of organizations in the public sector over a four-year period, showed that even controlling for all performance indicators available, it is still a wise choice to invest in employees for maximum organizational performance:
· The results are convincing; they are found across a wide array of performance measures, and they can even be found for almost all of the measures when controlling for past performance. The evidence provides especially strong support for the proposition that the human side contributes to tangible, measurable results (2009:513).
According to Goldstein (1990 :157–172), a new supervision model in police organizations requires a decentralization of authority; a new dimension of supervision that capitalizes on the knowledge of frontline supervisors, such as sergeants and lieutenants; an alteration in the criteria for recognizing and evaluating performance among officers; a change in the recruitment and selection of new officers; a revitalized sense of purpose and direction in training; and the development of new sources of information and new knowledge on how to address crime-related problems within communities.
Similarly, Wright (1994) offers identical prescriptions for correctional administrators and managers. He suggests that correctional institutions can be made more cohesive and can work toward both organizational goals and developing people in the organization. Wright’s ideas center around three fundamental concepts associated with the human service model of employee supervision: employee ownership, delegation, and the sharing of power.
Employee ownership refers to gaining a greater voice in the creation of institutional policy. According to Wright, correctional employees who are able to express their concerns within the context of decision making are more productive employees and experience less stress. In his words, “People who ‘own’ their job and ‘own’ their organization feel strong, capable, and committed” (1994:48). This ownership is structured within the concept of delegation. Delegation allows employees, within prescribed limits, the opportunities to make decisions that affect their ability to perform tasks. As such, delegation is not without structure or undirected participation by lower-level employees; it is the ability to maximize the knowledge and skills of employees in a directed fashion ( Lambert, Hogan, and Tucker, 2009 ). In short, delegation exploits the experiences of the workers.
The sharing of power follows nicely from the concept of delegation. Sharing power assumes that power is not a finite entity. Instead, power is viewed as “energy, potential, and competence” ( Wright, 1994 :51). Power is given to employees in such a way that they are able to enhance their performance levels and adjust to contingencies of the institutional environment. Under such a view, the correctional worker is viewed as an active contributor to the organization, not simply a reactive automaton to institutional policies and procedures.
Taken together, these three ideas generate a work philosophy that seeks to institutionalize greater authority in the hands of employees and respects their intelligence and creativity in a changing correctional environment. Such a philosophy has been the model for the Federal Bureau of Prisons since the mid-1960s and is known as unit management. Unit management is an organizational design as well as an operating philosophy for the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Houston (1999) defines unit management as having the following components:
· ■ A small number of inmates (50 to 120) who are permanently assigned together
· ■ A multidisciplinary staff (unit manager, case manager[s], correctional counselor [s], full- or part-time psychologist, clerk typist, and correctional officers) whose offices are located within or adjacent to the inmate housing unit and are permanently assigned to work with the inmates of that unit
· ■ A unit manager who has administrative authority and supervisory responsibility for the unit staff
· ■ A unit staff that has administrative authority for all within-unit aspects of inmate living and programming
· ■ Inmates who are assigned to the unit because of age, prior record, specific behavior typologies, a need for a specific type of correctional program, such as drug abuse counseling, or random assignment
· ■ Unit staff who are scheduled by the unit manager to work in the unit evenings and weekends, on a rotating basis, in addition to the unit correctional officer. Within the institution, the guiding principle is to have a flexible set of rules and regulations that allows staff the discretion and direction to complete tasks.
For advocates of unit management, the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. Houston (1999 :325) suggests the following advantages: a greater sense of cohesion and community between inmates and staff; an increase in the contacts between inmates and staff, which leads to better communication and a positive work environment; a decentralizing of decisions within the correctional units that improves decision making; and greater program flexibility.
Such advantages must be weighed, however, within the context of competing disadvantages. Houston (1999 :325–326) offers the following disadvantages to unit management. Unit management is costly and labor intensive, takes much time and resources to implement, and, most telling, threatens the organizational status quo. In particular, it challenges fundamental ways of doing business in the prison. Instead of the traditional hierarchical control found in most prisons, unit management increases the flexibility of subordinates and decentralizes authority at the operational level—in this case, within the housing unit where staff completes the day-to-day functions of the prison.
Wright (1994 :54) offers the primary reason correctional administrators have been slow to adopt unit management:
· Some top executives may feel uneasy about giving up control…. They may wonder whether they can depend on line staff to make critical decisions. Yet, most prisons are too large for a few administrators to get to know all the inmates well. Unit management provides for more efficient and informed decision making because the individuals making the decisions spend the most time with inmates.
In this statement, we see the fundamental difference between the traditional model and the human service model. The primary concern of the traditional model is control of the employee, whereas the human service model stresses the completion of organizational tasks. The often tumultuous and uncertain political environment forces criminal justice administrators to stress accountability and control of employees. Employees’ concerns, meanwhile, center on task completion. Often there is conflict between the organization’s search for control and certainty and the desire to accomplish “soft” organizational objectives and goals. Wilson (2000 :168–171) has documented how many public service agencies are what he called “coping organizations.” Unlike product-based organizations, these types of organizations cannot observe their own outcomes and outputs. It is often difficult to identify what tasks are actually related to the accomplishment of specific goals in coping organizations.
Given this situation, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for administrators in coping organizations to give up power, decentralize their organizations, and empower employees. They fall back on what they can do well and that usually means hierarchy and other traditional practices that, on the surface, provide greater control of employees as well as measures of output that have a control focus.
Such a view questions the applicability of the human service model to criminal justice organizations. Wright (1994 :43–47) discusses how correctional administrators often stress centralization of authority, clear rules, and uncertainty avoidance in their organizations. This means greater bureaucracy and tighter organizational control. Yet advocates of the human service model seek a loosening of the organizational reins by administrators. Is this really possible?