Deterrence Theory
A prime purpose of punishment has long been to deter future illicit behavior. Deterrence works on two levels. Specific deterrence occurs when an individual is punished for wrongdoing, and learns the price of misbehavior. General deterrence affects the population at large who observes the fact that misbehavior leads to punishment. Another possible result of punishment that achieves the opposite effect is labeling, whereby the wrongdoer’s life is irreparably damaged by the experience of punishment. Not all individuals or populations respond to deterrence in the same way. Domestic violence offenders, white collar criminals, juvenile delinquents and capital murderers all present unique ways to consider the validity of the deterrent effect.
Keywords Browning-Ferris Industries; Inc. v. Kelco; Criminogenic Effect; General Deterrence; Labeling; Punishment Avoidance; Punitive Damages; Recidivism; Roper v. Simmons; Specific Deterrence; Subjective Utility Theory
Deviance & Social Control > Deterrence Theory
Overview
Punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime that has been committed—after all one cannot undo what is past—but for the sake of the future, to prevent either the same man, or by the spectacle of his punishment, someone else, from doing wrong again. —Plato, Protagoras (in Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, 2004, p. 351)
7/24/22, 1:29 PM @ Walden University Library
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It has long been a source of speculation: just what effect does punishment have on an individual’s behavior? As far back as the end of the 19th century, Durkheim posited that the “pain of punishment” would deter offenders from repeating their behavior, especially when the “punishment is swift, certain and severe” (Sherman & Berk, 1984, p. 261). More recent theorists take the opposite tack: punishment serves to make recidivism more likely, as all aspects of the offender’s life are altered, and legal avenues for obtaining employment are shut. Sherman and Berk wisely speculate that there is no one effect of punishment; responses vary by personality, but also by the type of offense. They argue that white collar criminals, juveniles, drug dealers and violent offenders all present very different profiles.
In “Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy,” Kateb argues that the justifications for state inflicted pain— whether corporal or not, he sees all punishment as pain—deserves far more serious consideration. The arrest and punishment of criminals has long been considered a core function of the state. He finds this troublesome in a constitutional democracy; no longer should mere sovereignty be an adequate justification for punishment. He believes there should be a reluctance to inflict the pain of punishment in a democracy, with the principle justification being that it can serve as deterrence. It is not that wrongdoing deserves to be answered with pain, but that the pain serves to deter (Kateb, 2007).