Unit I Article Critique

Using the internet or other resources:

1. Use apa.org and asanet.org to research and select two articles or documents that address how psychology and

sociology influence human behavior. You may select one article for psychology and another for sociology, or you

may select two articles and address both psychology and sociology. Regardless, you will submit only one

assignment to address both articles you selected.

2. In the first paragraph, provide an overview of the articles.

3. In the second paragraph, discuss how sociology and psychology influence human behavior.

4. In the third paragraph, provide more specific details of the articles.

5. In the fourth paragraph, provide at least two examples of how you have experienced or been exposed to these

two concepts influencing behavior.

6. In the fifth paragraph, include a summary or conclusion.

Your completed assignment must be at least one to two pages and include a cover page.

Psychiatry 68(2) Summer 2005 95

Understanding Mass Panic and Other Collective Responses to Threat and Disaster

Anthony R. Mawson

While mass panic (and/or violence) and self-preservation are often assumed to be the natural response to physical danger and perceived entrapment, the literature indicates that expressions of mutual aid are common and often predominate, and collective flight may be so delayed that survival is threatened. In fact, the typical response to a variety of threats and disasters is not to flee but to seek the proximity of familiar persons and places; moreover, separation from attachment figures is a greater stressor than physical danger. Such observations can be explained by an alternative “social attachment” model that recognizes the fundamentally gregarious nature of human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight occurs, the latter can be understood as one aspect of a more general affiliative response that involves escaping from certain situations andmoving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be objectively safe. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly on the social context and especially the whereabouts of familiar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their physical presence has a calming effect and reduces the probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combining the factors of perceived physical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that encompasses a wide spectrum of collective responses to threat and disaster. Implications of themodel for predicting community responses to terrorist attacks and/or use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed.

The collective response to threat and or bombing attacks ( Janis, Chapman, Gillin, & Spiegel, 1955), structural fires (Best, 1978;disaster is often portrayed as tending toward

hysteria and social breakdown, with mass Keating, 1982; Proulx, 2002), and disasters (Fritz & Williams, 1957; Kinston & Rosser,panic (and/or violence) as the natural response

to physical danger and perceived entrapment. 1974; Noji, 1997; Quarantelli, 1960, 2001). On the contrary, expressions of mutual aid areHowever, mass panic is uncommon in situa-

tions such as combat (L’Etang, 1966), air-raid common and tend to predominate. Nonethe-

Anthony R. Mawson, MA, DrPH, is Professor of Public Health, Director, Institute of Epidemiology andHealth Services Research, and Co-Principal Investigator, National Center for Biodefense Communica- tions, School of Public Health, College of Public Service, at Jackson State University, 350West Woodrow Wilson Avenue, Suite 2301-B, Jackson, MS 39213; E-mail: [email protected].

I am indebted to John Grundy and the late Professor Donald Mackay, Keele University, for their valuable comments and support during the early phases of my research on mass panic. I also thank GaChavis Green, medical student, for research assistance, and my wife Carol Andersen for editorial advice. Four anonymous reviewers provided additional useful comments. I dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Dr. Jonathan Sime, whose untimely death has robbed us of a brilliant scholar and colleague.

96 Understanding Mass Panic

less, given the September 11, 2001, attacks on as inappropriate or as highly intense fear or flight, instances of panic are difficult to iden-the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the

immediately subsequent anthrax letters, and tify in practice. The judgment of panic is usu- ally made retrospectively, especially if seriouswidespread continuing concerns regarding

population behavior in the event of terrorist loss of life occurred, but what may be consid- ered inappropriate, excessive, irrational, orattacks using weapons of mass destruction

(Durodié & Wessely, 2002; Hyams, Murphy, highly intense by observers may not be so judged by the participants themselves (Fore-& Weesely, 2002; Levy and Sidel, 2003), a

fresh appraisal of the literature on collective man, 1953; Mawson, 1978, 1980; Schoch- Spana, 2003; Sime, 1980; Swartz, 1980;Wood,responses to threat and disaster is needed.

The review indicates that the typical 1972). For instance, rushing for the exits in a structural fire may be the only rational courseresponse to a variety of physical threats is nei-

ther “fight nor flight” but affiliation—that is, of action to take (Lazarus, 1966). Hence, the decision to label instances of collective flightseeking the proximity of familiar persons and

places, even though this may involve ap- as panic is arbitrary. Common symptoms of intense fear, such as anxiety, nausea, vomiting,proaching or remaining in a situation of dan-

ger; indeed, separation from attachment fig- and dizziness, can be normal reactions to ab- normal events (Lacy & Benedek, 2003; Pastel,ures is a greater stressor than physical danger

itself. Such observations can be explained by 2001). This discussion focuses on individual and collective flight behavior, recognizing thatan alternative, “social attachment” model of

collective behavior under threat, a model that such behavior can assume varying degrees of intensity.recognizes the fundamentally social nature of

human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight does occur, the latter can be understood as THE CAUSES OF GROUP FLIGHT one aspect of a more general affiliative re- sponse that involves escaping from certain sit- According to the classical “entrapment

theory” ofmass panic (e.g., Chandessais, 1971;uations and moving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar, but which may Fritz & Marks, 1954; Fritz &Williams, 1957;

Janis, 1971; Janis et al., 1955; Killian, 1972;not necessarily be objectively safe. The occur- rence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly Mintz, 1951; Quarantelli, 1954, 1957, 1977;

Smelser, 1963; Turner, 1964), flight occurs ifon the social context and especially the loca- tion of familiar persons (attachment figures); people believe that 1) major physical danger

is present or imminent, and 2) escape routesthat is, their physical presence is calming and reduces the probability of flight-and-affilia- are either limited or rapidly closing. Condi-

tions 1 and 2 are individually necessary; to-tion, while their absence has the opposite ef- fect. Combining the factors of perceived phys- gether they provide sufficient conditions for

group flight. According to Janis and Leventhalical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that en- (1968), “It is this combination of cognitions,

whether or not they are correct inferencescompasses a broad spectrum of collective re- sponses to threat and disaster. Implications about the situation . . . designated as ‘per-

ceived entrapment,’ which is most likely toof the social attachment model for predicting community responses to terrorist attacks and/ lead to wild flight, trampling of fellow victims,

and other uncontrollable, distraught reactionsor the use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed. of the type referred to as panic” (p. 1061).

A specific belief in danger can be inferred from the circumstances of many instances ofTERMINOLOGY mass flight, for example, from theater fires (Smelser, 1963, p. 151), but the existence ofThe term “panic” refers to inappropriate

(or excessive) fear and/or flight and highly such beliefs among participants in some cases of troop flight has been questioned. For in-intense fear and/or flight. But whether defined

Mawson 97

stance,Marshall (1947) states that “every large tives and friends. Most of those who fled were either unattached to families in the area orpanic starts with some very minor event . . .

(T)roops will always run if they see others fled only after other family members had as- sembled (Cantril et al., 1940, pp. 144–146).running and do not understand why” (p. 145).

A belief in limited or closing escape routes appears This was contrary to newspaper reports at the time, of a mass exodus from New York City.to have been a necessary condition in many

historic cases (Smelser, 1963, p. 137), but some A Swedish study of responses to a radio broadcast of a fictitious radioactive leak frommilitary panics have occurred in situations

where escape routes were virtually unlimited a nuclear power plant (Rosengren, Arvidson, & Sturesson, 1975) involved a telephone sur-(Schultz, 1964a, p. 11).

Are both beliefs sufficient to cause flight? vey of a representative sample of the popula- tion and unstructured interviews with policeThe theory accounts successfully for the clas-

sic, theater-fire type panics, such as the Chi- and other authorities. Contrary to media re- ports of widespread “panic,” only about 1%cago Iroquois Theater Fire of 1906, and the

February 17, 2003, fire at South Side Chica- reacted behaviorally to it, consisting “as a rule . . . of contacting family members, relatives orgo’s Epitome nightclub, in which 21 people

were killed and 19 others critically injured neighbors, over the telephone or face-to-face . . .” (p. 307). Not a single case was found(Rosengren et al., 1975; see http://www.cnn.

com/2003/US/Midwest/02/17/chicago.night among the 1,089 respondents of anyone actu- ally fleeing. If such reactions occurred, theclub/index/html). But flight does not always

occur even though both beliefs, or conditions, authors suggested, they were very rare. As mentioned, mass flight from theare present. Tyhurst (1951) studied reactions

to community disasters and found that only scene of community disasters is uncommon. “Organized” and often altruistic behavior is12% to 25% of adults responded by fleeing

when informed that their apartment house the rule (Edwards, 1976; Feinberg & Johnson, 2001; Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Johnson,was on fire or that a flash flood was imminent.

Three-quarters or more engaged in aimless 1987; Keating, 1982; Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Proulx, 2002, 2003;Quarantelli&Dynes, 1977;and irrelevant movements rather than the ex-

pected flight behavior. Schoch-Spana, 2003). Although the condi- tions for flight stipulated by the theory doConvincing evidence against the theory

comes from two detailed case studies specifi- not exist in most disasters, in those where the conditions would be expected to prevail, suchcally concerned with mass flight. The famous

Orson Welles radio broadcast, “War of the as anticipated bombing raids, approaching tidal waves, or fires in high-rise buildings,Worlds,” in October 1938 dramatically de-

picted the advance of Martians in terms of evacuation has often been minimal (Edwards, 1976; Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Lachman, Tat-partial encirclement—precisely the conditions

for flight stipulated by the theory. The broad- suoka, & Bonk, 1961; Proulx, 2002). cast occurred when radio listening was at a peak in the United States and took the form of a newscast, that is, “news” being reported ASSUMPTIONS IN THE

“ENTRAPMENT” THEORYin a highly realistic manner. According to esti- mates made at the time (Cantril, Gaudet, & OF FLIGHT Herzog, 1940), 6 to 12 million people heard the broadcast and 28% (i.e., 2.5 million) be- Earlier views of mass panic rested on

the following assumptions:lieved the program was an actual newscast. Of these 2.5million, 70%were “excited” or afraid (Lemkau, 1973). No estimate was provided of 1. The typical response to danger is self-

preservative aggression or flight (see, forthe number of persons who fled, but of those who listened to the broadcast, believed what example, Brown, 1954; Cannon, 1929;

McDougall, 1920; Petersen, 1953).they heard, and were frightened, the vast ma- jority did not flee but instead contacted rela- According to McDougall (1920),

98 Understanding Mass Panic

“(T)he sudden appearance of immi- imity of familiar conspecifics and places, even if this involves remaining in or approaching anent dangermay instantaneously con-

vert any concourse of people into a situation of danger (Baker & Chapman, 1962; Henderson, 1977; Kinston & Rosser, 1974).crowd and produce the characteristic

and terrible phenomena of a panic. Bowlby (1973, p. 91) has suggested that at- tachment behavior serves the evolutionary-In each man, the instinct of fear is

intensely excited; he experiences that adaptive function of providing protection from natural predators, and notes that inhorrible emotion in full force and is

irresistibly impelled to save himself by young animals of many species, attachment behavior frequently takes precedence over es-flight” (p. 24).

2. Flight is directed toward an objectively cape. Both Cantril et al. (1940) and Rosengren et al. (1975), in their studies of responses tosafe place, away from danger. In his clas-

sic text on collective behavior, Smelser threatening radio broadcasts, found that indi- viduals sought out loved ones and only fled(1963) defined panic as “collective

flight based on a hysterical belief,” when all family members had assembled. In the devastating Southeast Michigan Flint-and asserted that when people have

accepted a “belief about some gener- Beecher tornado of June 1953, people tended to turn to and protect loved ones rather thanalized threat [they] flee from estab-

lished patterns of social interaction in flee from the threat (Form & Nosow, 1958, pp. 26–27). Studies of behavior in structuralorder to preserve life, property, or

power from that threat” (p. 131). fires likewise show that occupants tend to con- verge and cluster (Bryan, 1985, 1986, 2002).Quarantelli (1957) also noted the typ-

ically short duration of flight and sug- Governments and other official organi- zations have great difficulty getting people togested that this related directly to

the individual’s perception of having evacuate before and during disasters; “tradi- tional family ties often keep individual mem-reached a safe distance from the threat.

3. Implicit in the disaster literature is bers in the danger zone until it is too late” (Hill & Hansen, 1962, p. 217). In Englandthat physical dangers are more disturbing

or stressful than other kinds of events. during World War II, evacuation programs were seriously hampered because parents pre-4. Flight is prevented from occurring in

danger situations by social control in the ferred to keep their children with them at home in the cities rather than send them awayform of regimentation, discipline,

firm leadership (Boring, 1945, p. 456; to the safety of the countryside (Titmuss, 1950). Studies indicate that most residentsKelland, 1930; LaPiere, 1938; L’Et-

ang, 1966; Rickman, 1938), and other tend to remain in the disaster area, while those who flee are unattached to the area (Cantril etsocial norms (Smelser, 1963, pp. 157–

163) that take effect by regulating or al., 1940, pp. 144–146; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). When residents are forced to evacuate,constraining the individual’s natural

tendency to flee. they tend to do so as a group (e.g., Cantril et al., 1940; Freeman & Cooper, 1940) or in family units (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977), thereby maintaining proximity and contactRESPONSE TO THREAT with familiars. Remaining close to compan- ions in combat is also more important to theEvidence suggests that each of the

above assumptions is questionable. individual than avoiding enemy fire (Marshall, 1947, p. 195).1. Self-Preservative Flight. Human be-

ings under threat of death are not motivated 2.Direction of Flight. Flight is not always directed toward an objectively safe place, awayby a simple drive for physical safety. Rather

than fight or flight, the typical response to from danger, but tends to be part of a wider response that simultaneously involves move-danger is affiliation, that is, seeking the prox-

Mawson 99

ment away from danger and movement to- appearance of new types of weapon on the battlefield, explosions, flooding, disease epi-ward objects and situations that are familiar

and perceived as safe. Studies of young animals demics, military invasion, and the like. Predis- posing conditions implicated in cases of massand children indicate that flight is usually di-

rected not simply away from danger but to- flight (Schultz, 1965; Strauss, 1944) include fatigue, illness, malnutrition, and excessiveward familiar conspecifics and places. In many

species, “to move away from an alarming situ- heat or cold (Boring, 1945; Dollard, 1944; Lang & Lang, 1961; Meerloo, 1950), as wellation is . . . only half the picture of fear behav-

ior. The other half is to move towards some as psychosocial factors such as isolation, poor morale, loss of confidence in leaders, and theplace treated as though safe or to make physi-

cal contact with companions” (Bowlby, 1973, absence of leaders or companions (Boring, 1945; Janis, 1963; Lang & Lang, 1961; Mar-p. 129). Salzen (1978) also suggests that flight

or escape serves to move organisms from areas shall, 1947; Meerloo, 1950; Quarantelli, 1954, 1957, 1977; Schultz, 1964b, 1971a).of strange to areas of familiar stimulation, and

Gray (1971) hypothesizes that active avoid- Attachment behavior is similarly elic- ited by alarming events such as the appearanceance behavior is motivated by the search for,

and reinforced by, the attainment of “safety of unfamiliar persons, by strange and unfamil- iar surroundings (Bowlby, 1969, p. 259;signals” in the environment.

In the classic cases of flight from the- Bowlby, 1973, pp. 96–123), as well as by the predisposing conditions listed above: fatigue,aters and other buildings, where escape seems

to be the single overriding motive, little con- hunger, ill-health, cold, and actual or threat- ened separation (Alloway, Pliner, & Krames,sideration has been given to the sequelae and

directionality of flight. Although the initial 1977; Bowlby, 1969, p. 259; Bowlby, 1973). 3. Physical versus Psychosocial Stress.response to sudden danger may be unidirec-

tional escape, the immediately subsequent re- Physical danger, as a whole, appears to be far less disturbing or stressful than separationsponse is to contact relatives and friends by

telephone or by going home, as soon as the from familiar conspecifics and surroundings ( Janis & Leventhal, 1968, pp. 1061–1064;individuals concerned can do so. In general,

evacuees orient themselves in the direction of Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Edwards, 1976). During the bombing raids on London inrelatives whose homes are outside the danger

area (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Moore, Bates, World War II, children showed no particular signs of distress, even if exposed to extremelyLaymon, & Parenton, 1963, p. 57). Evacuat-

ing families forced to go to official evacuation violent scenes, if they were with a parent dur- ing such incidents. It was only if children weresites tend to form clusters that partially dupli-

cate their old neighborhoods (Bates, 1963), separated from parents under these conditions that serious psychological disturbances oc-suggesting an “intention to restore the famil-

iar in the midst of unfamiliar surroundings” curred (Freud & Burlingham, 1945), suggest- ing that disruption of the family bond was a(Bolin, 1976, p. 268). Affiliative behavior con-

tinues at a high level of intensity after disasters more traumatic factor than the air raids (Glover, 1942). Glass (1954) similarly foundinvolving escape behavior, and after disasters

in general (Bloch, Silber, & Perry, 1956; New- that only 15% of psychiatric casualties evacu- ated from battle zones and, given intensiveman, 1976). Interactions with family members

are also more frequent up to three years after psychotherapy, could subsequently be re- turned to combat. If these men were kept indisasters (Bates, 1963; Bolin, 1976; Drabek &

Key, 1976; Erickson, 1977, 1995). the battle zones with their own units, the rate of return to combat was much higher. In ana-All of the conditions known to elicit

flight in humans also elicit attachment behav- lyzing the social and psychological effects of tornado disasters, Moore (1958) found moreior (Bowlby, 1969). Precipitating conditions for

flight include “alarming events” of many dif- frequent symptoms of disturbance among per- sons forced tomove because of serious damageferent kinds (Schultz, 1965) such as fires, the

100 Understanding Mass Panic

to their homes than among those who were 170) or if morale is high (LaPiere, 1938, pp. 458–459). Conversely, being alone, in an unfa-able to remain. Non-returning evacuees expe-

rience significantly more fearful reactions, in- miliar environment, orwith strangers heightens the response to stress (Back & Bogdonoff,juries, and other problems than those remain-

ing in the disaster area (Milne, 1977a, b). In 1964; Edwards, 1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan, Cassel, & Gore, 1977; Kinston &general, separation from or the loss of familiar

persons and surroundings has profoundly ad- Rosser, 1974) and increases the probability of flight (Keegan, 1976, p. 271; Lanham, 1943).verse effects on mental and physical health

(DeVries, Glasper, & Detillion, 2003; Erick- son, 1977; Henderson, 1977; Jacobs & Ost-

THE RARITY OF FLIGHTfeld, 1977; Lynch, 1998; Rutter, 1972). IN COMMUNITY DISASTERS4. Prevention of Panic.The rarity of mass AND COMBATflight among combat troops has often been

attributed to regimental discipline and firm Flight is said to be rare in these situa- leadership, but social control in the form of tions because the necessary and sufficient con- coercion does not account for persistent com- ditions (belief in imminent danger and limited bat effectiveness in the face of danger (Keegan, escape routes) do not usually hold, and be- 1976, p. 277). Individuals of many species of- cause social controls are operative. However, ten remain calm and unafraid in danger situa- flight does not always occur even when both tions, an effect that seems to depend largely conditions appear to be present. As we have on the immediate social context; that is, indi- seen, physical danger tends to elicit approach viduals are calmed by the presence of attach- to familiar persons and places; most disasters ment objects, while the reverse is true if they tend to occur in familiar surroundings; and are alone, with strangers, or in unfamiliar sur- both disaster victims (and troops in the combat roundings (Bovard, 1959; Bowlby, 1973, p. zone) tend to be with individuals to whom 297; DeVries et al., 2003; Epley, 1974; Gun- they are attached. Hence, affiliative “bunch- nar, 1998; Kamarck, Annunziato, & Amateau, ing” in the danger zone would be the expected 1995). outcome rather than flight. The rarity of flight

Fighting effectiveness and the willing- in community disasters and combat may also ness to engage in combat depend on the estab- be explained by the fact that both the appraisal lishment and maintenance of “primary group” of and response to danger are diminished by relations between officers andmen rather than the presence of attachment objects, as noted on loyalty to political ideals or fear (Grinker above. The observations that visitors tend to & Spiegel, 1945; Janis, 1963; Marshall, 1947: be the ones to flee disaster areas, and that 150; Phillips, 1943; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; “panic” is more common in recently assem- Stouffer et al., 1949). As Marshall (1947) elo- bled than in long-established military units quently states: “I hold it to be one of the (Shils & Janowitz, 1948) can be explained by simplest truths of war that the thing which the fact that the persons concerned are in un- enables an infantry soldier to keep going is familiar territory and with comparative strang- the presence of a comrade . . . The other man ers, and would thus be expected to have an may be almost beyond hailing distance, but increased tendency for flight-and-affiliation to he must be there somewhere within a man’s their own objects of attachment and familiar consciousness or the onset of demoralization locations. is almost immediate . . .” (p. 17). Morale sur- veys conducted in World War II showed that Explaining the Occurrence many soldiers were reluctant to be allocated of Flight in Non-Threatening to other units because they felt safer with their Situations own group ( Janis, 1963). The most extreme stresses, including drowning at sea, can be Collective flight on the battlefield has

been precipitated by the appearance of newcalmly faced if the individual is not separated from his fellows (Burns & Kimura, 1963, p. types of weapons (Auld, 1918; Meerloo, 1950,

Mawson 101

p. 49). However, flight can occur in the ab- of misgivings about him . . .” (Freud, 1922, p. 29), or because of the flight of a leader, entail-sence of danger and in situations where escape

routes are virtually unlimited (Freud, 1922; ing the break-up of affectional ties (Schultz, 1964b). As a result, the individual flees becauseMarshall, 1947; Schultz, 1964a, p. 11).Marshall

(1947) describes seven such incidents in World he suddenly feels alone and because his fears are intensified. The difference between theWar II, and noted their common origin: theories is that group ties must “break down”

[I]t can be laid down as a general rule that before external danger leads to flight. How- nothing is more likely to collapse a line of ever, when these ties have disintegrated, theinfantry than the sight of a few of its number

behavior of individuals is the same, that is, ain full and unexplained flight to the rear Hobbesian struggle for survival in the face of. . . That was how each of these seven inci-

dents got its start. One or two or more men closing escape routes. made a sudden run to the rear which others in Here we suggest an alternative hypoth- the vicinity did not understand . . . [I]n every esis: namely, that the initial run is experiencedcase the testimony of all witnesses clearly de-

by the observer as a threat to social ties, andveloped the fact that those who started the more specifically, as signaling abandonmentrun . . . had a legitimate or at least a reasonable

excuse for the action. (pp. 145–146) and separation. Thus, we interpret the subse- quent action of the observer not as an attempt

Two explanations have previously been to escape real or imagined dangers but as an suggested for such cases. First, according to attempt to maintain proximity with those who Smelser (1963): started the run, including the group leader,

that is, an affiliative response designed to reaf- [T]he initial flight itself creates—as the remarks firm social bonds (Mawson, 1978). ofMarshall show—a new set of necessary condi- In support of this interpretation, it hastions for panic. To see someone running wildly

been noted that combat troops and their offi-is prima facie evidence that he is seeking to cers—separated from family and familiar sur-escape through limited exits . . . and that he

is anxious. Furthermore, this observed flight roundings—grow fiercely attached to each is a precipitating event for the observer, and other; and these bonds are especially strong gives rise to the belief that something fright- prior to and during combat (Ambrose, 2002,ening is present, even though this “some-

p. 109, but seeMoskos, 1975, on the Vietnamthing” may not be identical to that which War; Dasberg, 1976; George, 1971; Janis,caused the original flight. (p. 154) 1963; Little, 1964; Sohlberg, 1976; Stouffer et al., 1949; Teichman, 1977). The threat ofSmelser proposes that those who ran

after seeing others doing so believed that dan- separation is also amajor determinant of affili- ative behavior as well as a common experienceger was imminent and that escape routes were

closing. This explanation cannot be entirely on the battlefield (Dasberg, 1976, p. 311), and there ismuch evidence that attachment behav-discounted. However, the explanation dwells

exclusively on what the initial flight means to ior occurs under such conditions. Individual soldiers try to avoid being separated; they willthe observer in terms of objective dangers to

be anticipated rather than what it means in go through danger to be reunited with their unit, and tend to bunch together in combatlight of the observer’s relationship to the fleeing

individual(s), and it underemphasizes the nu- (Marshall, 1947, p. 340). ances of meaning that can arise when one or more men, in whom confidence and trust have THE SOCIAL ATTACHMENT been placed, behave contrary to expectations. MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

A second hypothesis begins with the IN DISASTERS observation that strong affectional ties exist- ing between the members of most military The social attachment model (Mawson,

1978, 1980) represents a synthesis of the aboveunits make the danger of combat seem rela- tively slight. Panic arises because of the “loss observations and conclusions. Its central ten-

ets are as follows:of the leader in some sense or other, the birth

102 Understanding Mass Panic

1) Maintaining proximity to familiars is flight-and-affiliation depends largely on the se- verity of predisposing conditions. If precipitat-the dominant motive in disasters, an

intense expression of the fundamen- ing and predisposing conditions are subdivided, respectively, into two extremes—“anxiety ver-tally gregarious nature of human be-

ings. sus fear or terror” and “attachment figures pres- ent/absent”—a fourfold typology of progres-2) Flight can be considered the reverse

side of the coin of affiliative behavior, sively more intense responses emerges (labeled Outcomes A, B, C, and D) that incorporates athat is, one aspect of a more general

response that involves movement wide spectrum of collective reactions to threats and disasters (Figure 1).away from danger and toward people

and places viewed as familiar. Outcome A—Affiliation3) The occurrence of flight-and-affilia- tion depends not only on the per- Where the level of physical danger is

low (causing anxiety) and individuals are inceived degree of danger but, more im- portantly, on the social context, that the presence of attachment figures or objects,

the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is high,is, the location or whereabouts of fa- miliar persons and places. and flight from the vicinity is rare; the usual

outcome is increased attachment behavior. This4) The presence of familiar persons influ- ences the perception of and response is the most common response to community

threats and disasters. Individuals tend to con-to danger, in that fear is diminished by proximity to attachment figures. tact relatives and friends and/or remain to-

gether at home. Other examples of Outcomea. In situations where individuals are close to attachment figures, not A are increased bunching activity among

troops in the combat zone, and the myriadeven the most severe environmen- tal threats ordinarily cause flight; everyday instances of attachment behavior

shown by children and adults in the face ofthe usual outcome is intense affilia- tive behavior. mild threats (e.g., calling or going home).

b. On the rare occasions when flight Outcome B—Orderly Evacuationdoes occur, individuals tend to by Non-Residentsmove away as a group, thereby maintaining proximity with at- Where the degree of danger is low, but

individuals are alone or with strangers, thetachment figures. c. However, in situations where the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is still rela-

tively low, and flight-and-affiliation of low inten-individual is alone orwith strangers, even mild threats can precipitate sity would be expected to occur. Such behavior is

often described not as panic but as orderlyflight-and-affiliation to familiar per- sons and locations at a distance. flight or evacuation. Exemplifying Outcome

B would be the flight-and-affiliative behavior of those temporarily away from home towards their own homes and families. At this level ofTYPOLOGY OF RESPONSES

TO DISASTER perceived danger (which tends to be mini- mized or downplayed in the home environ- ment), local inhabitants tend to remain in theirBased on the foregoing, a typology of

individual and collective reactions to threaten- familiar environment. ing situations is proposed, combining the fac- Outcome C—Evacuationtors of perceived degree of physical danger by Community Residents(precipitating condition) and levels of social sup- port available in the situation (i.e., the presence Where the danger level is high (intense

fear or terror) but people are with familiars,or absence of attachment objects) (predisposing condition). Whether a particular threat leads to flight-and-affiliation occurs occasionally in spite

Mawson 103

Outcome A:

Affiliation

Increased attachment

behavior, that is, individuals

seek proximity with familiar

people and locations, as

occurs in most community

disaters.

Flight-and-affiliation of low

intensity. Orderly movement

away from danger and toward

the familiar, for example,

evacuation by tourists in

“mild” community disasters

and “bunching” among

combat troops.

Outcome B:

Orderly Evacuation by Non-Residemts

Mild (Anxiety)

Perceived Degree of Physical Danger

(Precipitating Conditions)

Severe (Fear, Terror)

Outcome C:

Evacuation by Community Residents

Outcome D:

Intense Flight-and- Affiliation

As in Outcome A, or

occasional low-to-intense

flight-and-affiliation, for

example, orderly evacuation

in major disasters: occasional

“panic” in seasoned combat

units due to the appearance

of new weapons.

Intense flight-and-affiliation,

that is, responses commonly

labeled “mass panic,” as in

structural fires, and in

unattached or weakly

attached combat units.

Present Absent

Location of Attachment Figures (Predisposing Conditions)

Figure 1. Typology of individual and collective reactions to threat and disaster (Outcomes A–D), based on a combination of precipitating conditions—degree of physical danger, ranging from anxiety (“mild”) to fear and/or terror (“severe”)— and predisposing conditions—the whereabouts of attachment figures (physically present or absent).

104 Understanding Mass Panic

of exceptionally strong bonds to persons and hand, in the case of fires occurring in familiar locations such office buildings (and especiallyplaces in the danger zone. In such cases, indi-

viduals tend to evacuate as a group, either homes), people would be expected to show a tendency to increase their attachment behav-as families or neighborhood groups, thereby

keeping close together. The intensity of egress ior within the structure (Outcome A) rather than evacuating it (Outcome C). Affiliativedepends on the magnitude and imminence of

the threat. Examples of Outcome C include tendencies would presumably be shown par- ticularly strongly by children in their ownoccasional “panics” in seasoned military units

in the face of overwhelming or unexpected homes, and perhaps also by the frail elderly. In fact, research is needed to determine whetherdanger, and large-scale community evacua-

tions during major fires or other disasters. young children are more apt to engage in at- tachment behavior under such conditions and whether this may account, in part, for theOutcome D—Intense Flight-

and-Affiliation increased susceptibility of children to injury and death in residential fires. In residential fires in general, the model would predict a)Where the danger level is high (induc-

ing fear or terror) and individuals are either numerous manifestations of attachment be- havior to persons and places within the struc-alone or with strangers, flight-and-affiliative

behavior of high intensity would be expected to ture, b) a widespread tendency to downplay the danger, c) a general reluctance to evacuate,occur.This response is often described as “mass

panic.” Examples include the classic, entrap- d) prolonged delays in departure, and e) far less precipitous and intense escape behaviorment-type “panics,” together with cases of

flight-and-affiliation in combat units where than if the fire had occurred in an unfamiliar location. Several observations on behaviorattachments between individuals are either

weak or nonexistent and where, in effect, each during and after a fire in an apartment building in Winnipeg, Canada, support these predic-person experiences the stress of combat as an

isolated individual. In these types of situations, tions (Scanlon, 1979): flight-and-affiliation sometimes takes the • “former residents could not resist wand-form of highly individualistic and competitive ering back to the abandoned building”;behavior. However, such behavior can be • “44 percent of the occupants said thatviewed as an attempt to seek proximity and when the alarm was sounded they as-contact with distant attachment objects. Im- sumed it was a false alarm”;mediately or very shortly after vacating a • “Many of those who reacted to theburning building, individuals attempt to con- alarm . . . went looking for confirma-tact relatives and/or go “home”, that is, seek tory evidence of a fire”;the familiar. • “Despite the evidence of their own

senses, some people decided not to evacuate immediately . . . more than

BEHAVIOR IN half took their time leaving”; STRUCTURAL FIRES • “Some people, despite hearing an alarm,

carried on with incredibly inappropriateAspects of the typology can be illus- behavior and took enormous risks”;trated by noting the importance of the social • “Many people wandered around in thecontext in understanding collective responses building before they finally left”; andto different types of structural fire. In the case • “One in six people who left the build-of fires in theaters and clubs, people generally ing, in spite of seeing smoke and flamesencounter danger in an unfamiliar place, sur- while they were in the open, went backrounded by unfamiliar people. Intense flight- inside.”and-affiliation to attachment objects outside the theater (Outcome D) would therefore be In his review of the literature on behav-

ior in fire, Bryan (1986) cites numerous obser-the expected behavior pattern. On the other

Mawson 105

vations consistent with social attachment direction of movement in the area was based on a combination of the person’s role (andtheory. hence familiarity with a particular escape route), affiliative ties to individuals who were in another location in the building, and conse-RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL

ATTACHMENT MODEL quent proximity to one exit or the other. The contribution of group ties to deaths and injur- ies resulting from the Summerland fire wasThe social attachment (“affiliative”)

model of group behavior in emergencies has also analyzed by Sime. He found that all of the 13 people in the MSB who died werebeen formally tested in a number of studies.

Noting that the “panic model” assumes that attached to their groups when alerted to the fire, but “[t]hese groups evidently delayedescape involves a homogeneousmass of people

competing for limited exits, whereas the “affil- their departure. In trying to escape in groups . . . these people were caught by the encroach-iative” model predicts that individuals with

close ties first seek and find each other and ing smoke and flames” (Sime, 1983, p. 38). Affiliative behavior increased the danger to thethen attempt to escape as a group, Sime (1983,

1985) studied responses to fire in a large resort family groups because the latter were slower to escape. On the other hand, separated individ-complex (Summerland) in the United King-

dom based on accounts collected from 500 uals were quicker to respond to the ambiguous cues by escape behavior and hence none wassurvivors. About 3,000 vacationers were pres-

ent and 50 people died. Accounts of the fire seriously injured. Thus, group ties and affilia- tive patterns of behavior in entrapment situa-and behavior in the fire, collected from survi-

vors by the police, formed the basis of the tions created by building fires can increase the risk of injury and death to attached individualsstudy. This was a classic entrapment situation

inwhich a complete breakdown of psychologi- by delaying their departure. In a study of the evacuation behavior ofcal ties would have been expected on the

“panic” model. However, about 50 percent of occupants of the former World Trade Center following the explosion on February 26, 1993,those in the sample who were initially sepa-

rated from primary group members managed based on interviews with 350 participants, Aguirre, Wenger, & Vigo (1998) found thatto escape with the rest of their primary group,

and 73 percent escaped with one or more evacuating groups comprising a high propor- tion of acquainted personswith deep social tiesgroup members (79 percent were members of

families). Consistent with the social attach- were the slowest to begin evacuating. Other research consistently shows that people arement model, mixed-group members were less

likely to stay together in intact groups while slow to react to initial warnings and wait to evacuate with their primary group (Fitzpatrickescaping, and separated individuals did not try

to re-form into intact groups unless they had & Mileti, 1991; Perry, 1994). In high-rise buildings, a lethargic reaction is usually ob-family group attachments somewhere in the

building. Supporting the notion that move- served in response to fire alarms, voice com- munication instructions, or even initial cuesment toward familiar persons and places char-

acterizes flight behavior, most of those studied of a fire, and occupants are generally reluctant to leave their floor (Proulx, 1999).headed toward the familiar main entrance. A

detailed analysis of behavior in one area of the In the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Southgate, Kentucky, in May 1977, whichbuilding (Marquee Show Bar—MSB) showed

that individuals whowere separated from their resulted in 165 fatalities, social ties existing among the occupants of the club (family, so-group had positioned themselves near, and left

near, the entrance they were familiar with; cial, and occupational ties) profoundly influ- enced behavior in the fire. A high level ofrestaurant staff left by their familiar route to

work (the fire exit staircase); and most of the assistance and civility was shown to others, and it was concluded that the data supportedseparated individuals had positioned them-

selves close to the familiar entrance. Thus, the a “social organization” rather than a “social

106 Understanding Mass Panic

breakdown” model of behavior in fire (Fein- need to reassess their assumptions about the public’s capacity to respond constructivelyberg & Johnson, 2001; Johnson, 1988).

When the M/V Estonia car ferry sank after a terrorist attack” (Schoch-Spana, 2003, p. 132).in 1994, 851 passengers and crew died and

only 137 (14%) survived. The high fatality rate was due to the rapid sinking of the vessel, coupled with physical barriers to escape RESPONSE TO

NUCLEAR ATTACKcaused by severe listing. This made it virtu- ally impossible for family members or the crew to help one another. However, eyewit- It is uncertain how the general popula-

tion would respond to an unprecedented actness testimony revealed that people tried to form human chains by holding on to one of terrorism using biological, chemical, or nu-

clear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hi-another’s legs in the struggle to reach the upper deck, and great efforts were made to roshima and Nagasaki in 1945 may provide

a guideline. Some reports gave accounts ofprovide mutual aid. There were also many accounts of men fleeing with wives, mothers, confusion, hysteria, andmass flight (U.S. Stra-

tegic Bombing Survey, 1946, p. 28; Avalonor girlfriends, and of people attempting to stay together during the escape (Cornwell et Project, 1996–2003, ch. 23); however, these

were not the typical behavioral responses ofal., 2001). Following the more recent attack on survivors. Both cities were evacuated due to

hazardous conditions resulting from radioac-the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001, 480 first-person accounts were collected tive substances in the immediate environment,

but initial evacuations by survivors were car-from survivors about their evacuation, of which 324 accounts were available for analysis (Proulx, ried out calmly and in an organized way. The

unexpected calmness of disaster victims has2003). As many as 83 percent judged the situa- tion to be very serious in the first few minutes been termed “post-disaster utopia” (Cuthber-

tson & Nigg, 1987, pp. 444–462). As in mostafter the strike. Yet despite seeing flames, smoke, or falling paper, only 55 percent of the disasters, people expressed a longing for the

familiarity of home and sought out other sur-survivors evacuated immediately; another 13 percent stopped to retrieve belongings, and vivors. One woman stated that “she struggled

to her feet and joined a band of other survivors20 percent secured files and searched floors before evacuating. Initially, eight percent de- . . . . Home, she had to get home . . .” (Kurz-

man, 1986, pp. 14, 413–114). Survivors werecided to stay but changed their minds, and four percent were trapped due to collapsing described as attempting to leave the city to

get to the suburbs, but most people lived inceiling and walls, but then managed to escape. Many commented on how calm and helpful the suburbs and were trying to get home.

They were seeking the familiar rural or subur-the occupants were during the evacuation (http://irc.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca). ban communities where they lived and where

the bombs’ effects were not felt. “All the peo-Other reviews of behavior following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and ple were going in that direction and so I sup-

pose I was taken into this movement and wentPentagon and the subsequent anthrax letter mailings (Glass&Schoch-Spana, 2002; Schoch- with them,” said one survivor, implying that

many people assembled into groups and evac-Spana, 2003) similarly discounted long-held views that terrorist attacks would cause mass uated in an organized manner (Lifton, 1967,

pp. 20, 21–40). Similar accounts of responsespanic and social disorder (DiGiovanni, 1999; Stern, 1999; WHO, 1970). On the contrary, a to the bombings were given, mentioning acts

of bravery and the strong sense of companion-broad range of positive public responses were noted, including rescue work, volunteering, ship that developed among the survivors as

they came together and returned to theirproviding resources, and donating blood, indi- cating that “health and safety professionals homes (Barker, 1985; Linner, 1995; Wyden,

Mawson 107

1984, p. 255). Many hibakushas (survivors of toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be ob-the atomic bomb) related their experiences on

a video (HiroshimaWitness, 1990) produced by jectively safe. We have suggested that some military “panics” occurring in the apparentthe Hiroshima Peace Cultural Center. These

graphic personal descriptions of events in Au- absence of physical threat or danger, but trig- gered by the sudden departure of one or moregust 1945 show that although most survivors

were terrified and in a state of shock, their men to the rear, may in fact be affiliative re- sponses to the perceived threat of abandon-overriding goal was to be reunited with famil-

iar people and surroundings. One witness, ment by or separation from comrades. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliationHiroko Fukada, stated that he “went out of

the building because I thought it would be depends mainly on the social context and, more particularly, on the whereabouts of fa-dangerous to stay inside. Soon I found soldiers

walking in this direction. I was withmy friends miliar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their presence has a calming effect and reduces theand we thought it would be safe to go with

soldiers, and so we (did) . . .” This account probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combiningshows neither hysteria nor panic but calm de-

cision-making and a desire for companion- the factors of perceived physical danger and the location of attachment figures, and catego-ship. rizing them respectively as “mild/severe” (i.e., anxiety versus fear or terror) and “present/ absent,” results in a fourfold typology thatCONCLUSIONS encompasses a wide spectrum of collective re- sponses to threat and disaster.Until recently, mass panic (and/or vio-

lence) was thought to be the natural response Studies of collective behavior in disas- ters thus show that fear tends to be minimalto physical danger and perceived entrapment.

However, contrary to the “panic” or social and expressions of mutual aid predominate. On the negative side, however, people in groupsbreakdown model of collective behavior, the

typical response to a variety of threats and of familiars are generally slow to react to initial warnings, slow to leave work areas, and waitdisasters is not to flee or attack but rather

affiliation, that is, to seek the proximity of to assemble with their primary group before evacuating. Thus, evacuation may be so de-familiar persons and places; moreover, separa-

tion from attachment figures is a greater layed that survival is threatened. In certain situations, such as structural fires, the ten-stressor than physical danger. Multiple social

ties existing among participants in disaster sit- dency to seek the familiar in the face of immi- nent physical danger can have disastrous con-uations profoundly influence behavior. Men

flee with their wives, families, or girlfriends, sequences in terms of increasing the risk of severe injury or death. Ironically, becauseand attempt to stay together during escapes.

Nor do employees abandon their responsibili- tendencies toward hysteria and mass panic on the part of the public are widely assumed,ties toward patrons. A high degree of civility is

shown, and heroic efforts are made to provide officials are often reluctant to issue warnings, or delay doing so, for fear of causing panicmutual aid and assistance.

Such observations can be understood in (Sime, 1980). Yet delays in providing correct or sufficient information can result in entrap-terms of an alternative, “social attachment”

model of behavior that recognizes the funda- ment and death as a result of inactivity or active attachment behavior. Thus, from a pub-mentally gregarious nature of human beings

and the primacy of attachments. In the rela- lic health or safety point of view, the problem in disasters is not that people tend to panictively rare instances where flight does occur,

the latter can be viewed as one aspect of a and act precipitously in response to danger, but that people typically delay or fail to takemore general affiliative response that involves

escaping from certain situations and moving appropriate evasive action when it is needed.

108 Understanding Mass Panic

In recent decades, there has been an which attachments are essential for normal human growth, development, and social func-explosion of research interest in human bonds

and the way in which theymodulate the effects tioning as well as health and longevity. We have seen that close personal rela-of environmental stress and influence health

and social behavior (Beatson & Taryan, 2003; tionships strongly determine individual and collective responses to threat, but the policyBerkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000;

Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Brown et al., 1975; Cobb, implications of the social attachment model for public health and safety remain largely1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan et al., 1977;

Kiritz & Moos, 1974). Under a variety of unexplored, for example, with respect to fire safety and all aspects of preparedness, includ-stressful conditions, individuals approach fa-

miliar persons and places and are calmed by ing counterterrorism. It remains now to apply the social attachment model of behavior intheir presence. In sociological terms, there is

an increase in “we-feeling,” solidarity andmo- disaster, as well as observations indicating that people generally show an unexpectedly strongrale, but also a parallel increased sensitivity

to perceived deviance and a tendency toward capacity to organize and respond positively and unselfishly under such conditions, suchsocial exclusion, scapegoating, and hate crime

(Taintor, 2003). The study of responses to as, providing valuable back-services for over- worked “first-responders.” As recently empha-stress thus provides clues for understanding

human bonds and behavior, the dynamics of sized (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Schoch- Spana, 2003; http://www.upmc-biosecurity.which aremore difficult to observe under non-

emergency conditions. Collective social phe- org/pages/events/peoplesrole/ursano/ursano_ trans.html), these findings need to be incorpo-nomena, long considered a backwater of soci-

ology, can be seen as continuous with—and as rated into newmodels of health education and promotion so that community ties andillustrating—a broader model of human social

behavior that emphasizes the primacy of at- strengths can be actively harnessed by public health and other governmental agencies totachments, not in the Durkheimian sense

(Mawson, 1970), in which social relationships prepare and respondmore effectively to future disasters and possible terrorist attack.“restrain” an inherently selfish human nature,

but in a profoundly interactionist sense in

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FIR 4306, Human Behavior in Fire 1

UNIT I STUDY GUIDE

Introduction to Human Behavior

Course Learning Outcomes for Unit I Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:

1. Discuss myths and studies of people’s behavior during fires. 2. Describe some of the concepts of gaining mainstream acceptance of

studying human behavior in fire. 3. Explain how acceptance influences human behavior. 4. Describe how social psychology influences human behavior. 5. Discuss early documented studies of human behavior in fire. 6. Discuss the precognition span period for research on human behavior in

fire. 7. Discuss the most productive span period for research on human

behavior in fire. 8. Describe the performance code incentive years related to human

behavior in fire.

Unit Lesson Human behavior is nothing new to the fire service industry or other professions for that matter. As you review any part of history, you can reference behavior demonstrated by humans. History lessons in grade school taught you about the behavior of early mankind and even their use of fire. Many religious documents such as the holy bible have stories of human behavior that is affected by peer pressure, the environment, etc. In Unit I you will find that many of the myths of people’s behavior during fires are not all true. Researchers believe that humans have a natural desire to be accepted by others, and this desire can have a great effect on behavior. Sociological studies have shown how peer pressure or groups can influence behavior. In the workplace, many managers find that “breaking bread” or having a meal with employees can have great influence on being accepted and gaining support. A fire chief who is new to the department may have a different set of challenges than one who was promoted through the ranks of the departments. The latter may have a social connection with the fire department personnel and the community and more easily have support and acceptance of the department and community. The new fire chief from outside the department may be known by few in the department and have little to no contact within the community. However, there are many fire chiefs who have conquered this challenge. This unit discusses early studies of human behavior in fire. Although there is a lack of documented research on many historical fire situations, some of the documented fire incidents in night clubs, government buildings, and other locations can provide us with useful information on the occupants’ behavior. Many of you may recall watching television and witnessing some of the behavior of occupants in the MGM fire, the World Trade Center, and night club fires. Without being in the situation, it is very difficult for anyone to say if they would or would not behave differently.

Reading Assignment See information below.

Learning Activities (Non-Graded) See information below.

Key Terms 1. Performance code

incentive years 2. Prerecognition years 3. Productive years

FIR 4306, Human Behavior in Fire 2

Other issues that need to be understood in regards to fire behavior is that there are many situations where a person was fully aware of appropriate actions to take and yet, when confronted with a situation, he or she responded inappropriately. One example is a supervisor of a 9-1-1 center who was visiting her mother and her mother suffered a massive stroke. The supervisor admitted that she actually forgot the universal emergency number. Although fire drills may be conducted in schools regularly, often the behavior of students and teachers is far different from what is expected in an actual emergency. Even in the home, people may practice an escape plan and even participate in home fire drills. However, the plan may not prepare them for the unexpected issues during a real fire such as poison gases, disorientation, or even panic. The actual presence of fire does a good job getting people’s attention. In fact, some neighborhood watch groups have claimed that yelling “FIRE” during burglary or carjacking attempt will summon help from bystanders more easily that yelling “HELP.” This may not be a good thing in the long run. There are many situations where very young or elderly people are at the mercy of irresponsible or uniformed adults. This even includes being told what actions to take in the event of a fire. The irresponsible adult often does not accept or have knowledge of preferred actions to take during a fire. Consequently, this misinformation is passed onto the young people and elderly people in the home. Children may seek “shelter” in a closet or under a bed in the event of a fire. The elderly person may be physically unable to escape the fire. In some homes, older children have the task of cooking and caring for younger children. In the event of an emergency, such as a grease fire, the child may automatically pour water in the pan rather than something more appropriate. Who would predict that people would stay put during a fire? In situations where high-rise buildings have housed a casino, fire departments have reported that during fires calls at some of these establishments, it is very difficult to get the cooperation of the occupants if they are participating in gaming. Other fire fighters have very interesting stories of occupant behavior and their resistance to leave the area, even if smoke is present. Why do people refuse to leave a burning building, and why is it important that you understand this behavior? Human behavior in fire also affects fire fighters. There are examples of how even the most veteran of fire fighters may encounter a situation and demonstrate behavior that is not normal for them. However, because firefighters are trained to respond to these emergency situations, the majority of firefighters who encounter life-threatening situations remain calm and their behavior is just like they were trained to do. In some cases, a trapped fire fighter was out of air, yet he or she was able to calmly inform rescuers of this location and even obstacles in the path. Another situation that can affect a firefighter’s behavior might be fatigue. Take for example the case of a fire company responding to a structure fire at 2:30 a.m. The driver of the apparatus was a veteran driver/operator. However, after driving for one minute, the driver realized that he was driving in the opposite direction of the structure fire. Although he was very familiar with the street location within his assigned territory, he acknowledged that the early morning time may have contributed to his disorientation. If a trained firefighter can make an error due to fatigue, how do you think this issue might affect the behavior of a victim?

FIR 4306, Human Behavior in Fire 3

After completing this course, you should be able to evaluate your own fire behavior tendencies and those around you.

Reading Assignment In order to access the resources below, you must first log into the myCSU Student Portal and access the ABI/Inform Complete database within the CSU Online Library. Mawson, A. R. (2005). Understanding mass panic and other collective

responses to threat and disaster. Psychiatry, 68(2), 95-113. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/220706229?accountid=33337.

Learning Activities (Non-Graded) Take the time now to create or update your resume. If you do not have a resume, take a look at the resume templates found in Word and create one. Does your resume accurately reflect your job experience and your education? If not, take the time to update it. Keeping your resume updated not only helps you on a new job search, but can be used for promotional opportunities in your current job. A resume can be a great document to use if you want to work in the community and show your experience and expertise. You are not required to turn in your resume, but we will readdress this issue again at the end of this course. Non-graded Learning Activities are provided to aid students in their course of study. You do not have to submit them. If you have questions contact your instructor for further guidance and information.