Other problems with the concrete also surfaced.

Some of the concrete used in the runways contained clay balls up to 10 inches in diameter. While not uncommon in concrete batching, the presence of this clay can lead to runways that are signifi – cantly weaker than planned.

Questions about the short cement content in 3Bs concrete mixture also resur- faced in the November Denver Post article. The main question was “given that the concrete batching operation was routinely monitored, how did 3Bs get away with shorting the cement content of the concrete?” One of the batch plant operators for 3Bs explained that they were tipped off about upcoming inspections. When an inspector was due, they used the correct recipe so that concrete would appear to be correctly formulated. The shorting of the concrete mixture could also be detected by looking at the records of materials delivered to the batch plants. However, DIA administrators found that this documentation was missing, and it was unclear whether it had ever existed.

A batch plant operator also gave a sworn statement that he had been directed to fool the computer that operated the batch plant. The computer was fooled by tampering with the scale used to weigh materials and by inputting false numbers for the moisture content of the sand. In some cases, the water content of the sand that was input into the computer was a negative number! This tampering forced the computer to alter the mixture to use less cement, but the records printed by the computer would show that the mix was properly constituted. In his statement, the batch plant operator also swore that this practice was known to some of the highest offi cials in 3Bs.

Despite the problems with the batching of the concrete used in the runways, DIA offi cials insisted that the runways built by 3Bs met the specifi cations. This asser- tion was based on the test results, which showed that although some parts of the runway were below standard, all of the runways met FAA specifi cations. 3Bs was paid for those areas that were below standard at a lower rate than for the stronger parts of the runway. Further investigations about misdeeds in the construction of DIA

32 2.3 Codes of Ethics

were performed by several groups, including a Denver grand jury, a federal grand jury, the FBI, and committees of Congress.

On October 19, 1995, the Denver Post reported the results of a lawsuit brought by 3Bs against the city of Denver. 3Bs contended that the city still owed them $2.3 million (in addition to the $193 million that 3Bs had already been paid) for the work they did. The city claimed that this money was not owed. The reduction was a penalty due to low test results on some of the concrete. 3Bs claimed that those tests were fl awed and that the concrete was fi ne. A hearing offi cer sided with the city, deciding that Denver didn’t owe 3Bs any more money. 3Bs said that they would take their suit to the next higher level.

As of the spring of 2011, DIA has been in operation for many years and no problems have surfaced regarding the strength of the runways. Unfortunately, problems with runway durability might not surface until after several more years of use. In the meantime, there is still plenty of litigation and investigation of this and other unethical acts surrounding the construction of this airport.