Concerns with t̀hinking as general procedures
Although we believe that heuristics serve a useful role in learning to think critically, we do not regard them as the central feature of good thinking: there are two basic reasons why the general procedures view is an inadequate way of conceiving of critical thinking. We believe it misrepre- sents the major obstacle to good thinking, and grossly understates the signi® cance of contextual factors in deciding how to proceed in any particular case of critical thinking
On the general procedures view, the performance of certain tasks is seen to be a highly reliable means of achieving the desired results of thinking. The educational challenge is, therefore, to equip students with repertoires of procedures they can employ across the range of thinking situations. In our view, the mere performance of certain procedures identi® ed in descriptive terms is insu cient to ensure that what has happened counts as critical thinking.
The performance of tasks such as thinking of reasons for and against a position, or of brainstorming alternatives, does not guarantee that an individual is thinking critically. The proand con reasons that the individual comes up with may address only the most trivial aspects of the issue; so, too, the brainstorming of alternatives may miss the most sensible alter- natives. Learning to engage in such activities has little educational merit unless these things are done in such a way as to ful® l relevant standards of
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adequacy. Students have, after all, performed these sorts of tasks for much of their lives. The educational goal must be to teach them to do such tasks well by increasing their capacity and inclination to make judgements by reference to criteria and standards that distinguish thoughtful evaluations from sloppy ones, fruitful classi® cation schemes from trivial ones, and so on. A general procedures approach that does not teach standards of good thinking is unlikely to sharpen students’ critical judgement. It is for this reason we have suggested that critical thinking should be characterized not in terms of procedures to be carried out, but in terms of the standards a performance must ful® l to count as successful.
Critical thinking is a polymorphous or multi-form enterprise; there are numerous activities that may be helpful in solving a problem or reaching a decision. What steps are appropriate is determined both by the nature of the problem and its context. They are context-bound. For example, in deciding whether any particular government should support international military intervention in `civil’ wars, it is hard to imagine how one set of steps, or any limited set of procedures, could be appropriate for all such circumstances. Nor could the same sequence of problem-solving steps usefully be applied both to ® xing a failing relationship and to ® xing a civil war. Identifying both these situations as `problems’ masks the very di€ erent factors that need to be considered in deciding what should be done in each case.7 Given the diversity of problems and problem contexts, we believe that any account of the steps involved in problem solving or decision making will either be so vague as to be largely unhelpful, or they will be so speci® c that they will have little generalizability beyond a speci® c class of problems or decisions.
To a considerable extent, what we should do in solving a problem is determined by the standards that must be met for the solution in the particular case to be successful. In the case of a failing relationship, it may be lack of honesty with oneself that is the problem. In deciding whether a government should participate in an international intervention may involve honesty, but it often involves considering the e€ ect on the lives of many innocentsÐ and very large economic e€ ects. Following the decision-making model listed above may simply be an occasion to rationalize the self- deception that gave rise to the personal problem in the ® rst placeÐ or the international problem in the ® rst place. Nurturing open-mindedness may be the only s̀tep’ needed to repair this situation
We are not claiming that teaching about general procedures is a com- pletely inappropriate way to promote critical thinking. Rather, we empha- size that the e€ ectiveness of any procedure depends on its e cacy in helping students meet the relevant standards for good thinking: there are no inherent or highly reliable connections between learning to think well and performing particular operations. Put another way, what drives increased competence in thinking is greater mastery of the standards for judging an appropriate tackto take in a particular context, not learning pre- programmed, supposedly generalizable, procedures.
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Cri tic a l th in kin g an d th e pe d agogy o f p rac ti c e
We have reviewed three conceptions of critical thinking: skills, processes, and procedures. All three have been used to promote the idea that competence in thinking critically is gained primarily through practice. Thus, although we will focus in this section on the skills-conception as a source of the pedagogy of practice, we could just as well focus on either the process or the procedures view. Nickerson et al. (1985) discuss learning thinking skills as analogous to two ways of learning physical skillsÐ one when a person practises a particular skill to strengthen it; the other where, by appropriately directing intellectual energy, teachers replace the novice’s ine cient movements with more e cient ones. Practice is seen as exercis- ing the skills of critical thinking so that improvement will take place. Students may, for example, be given frequent opportunities to make comparisons in a variety of domains so that the s̀kill of comparing’ will be exercised, and this aspect of critical thinking improved. We contend, however, that critical thinking is not promoted simply through the repeti- tion of s̀kills’ of thinking, but rather by developing the relevant knowledge, commitments and strategies and, above all, by coming to understand what criteria and standards are relevant. Repetition does indeed have some role to play, but only if it takes place in the context of the development of such knowledge, criteria, commitments and strategies.
The main assumption underpinning the practice view is that critical thinking consists of avariety of discrete skills that can be improved through repetition. On this view critical thinking skills are analogous to skills in an athletic endeavour such as soccer, where it is possible to practise kicking, heading the ball, passing, etc., and to develop skill at each of these constituent activities independently of ever playing a football game. One repeats the skill until it has become routinized and one no longer needs to apply conscious attention to its execution.
However, this is not an appropriate model for what is involved in becoming better at critical thinking. Unlike athletic skill, skill in critical thinking cannot be separated from understanding the nature and purpose of the task one is attempting to accomplish.8 Becoming better at comparing, for example, involves learning to make comparisons according to relevant criteria, making comparisons which are appropriate to the particular circumstances, comparing with a view to the reason the comparison is being made, and so on.
We argued earlier that critical thinking cannot be characterized in terms of speci® c mental processes, and that there are no good grounds for supposing that terms like comparing, classifying and inferring denote generic mental processes which one can improve through repetition. Here, we emphasize that all aspects of critical thinking centrally involve judgement, and judgement cannot be made routine. Scheƒ er (1965: 103) makes this point with reference to chess:
critical skills call for strategic judgement and cannot be rendered automatic. To construe the learning of chess as a matter of drill would thus be quite wrong-headed in suggesting that the same game be played over and over
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again, or intimating that going through the motions of playing repeatedly somehow improves one’s game. What is rather supposed, at least in the case of chess, is that improvement comes about through development of strategic judgement, which requires that such judgement be allowed opportunity to guide choices in a wide variety of games, with maximal opportunity for evaluating relevant outcomes and re¯ ecting upon alternative principles and strategy in the light of such evaluation.
An examination of those areas where practice is helpfulÐ for example artistic performanceÐ makes evident that useful practice involves far more than mere repetition. Practising the piano is not simply a matter of continually repeating a piece in the same manner, but rather of being alert to and attempting to correct errors and continually striving for improvement according to the standards of quality performance. Dewey (1964: 201) makes the point that simply sawing a bow across violin strings will not make a violinist.
It is a certain quality of practice, not mere practice, which produces the expert and the artist. Unless the practice is based upon rational principles, upon insights into facts and their meaning, èxperience’ simply ® xes incorrect acts into wrong habits.
Howard (1982: 161, 162) also maintains that practice is not mere repetition, but claims that it is, rather, repetition which is g̀uided by speci® c aims such as solving various kinds of problems’ or ìmproving acquired skills’ , and ìn accord with some . . . criteria of performance’ which enable one to judge the level of mastery of the activity. Thus, he states:
Rather than mechanically duplicating a passage, one strives for particular goals, say, of ¯ uency, contrast, or balance. Successive repeats re¯ ect a drive toward such goals rather than passive absorption of a sequence of motor acts.
The question arises at this point as to how critical thinking can best be developed and what role practice plays in this development. We have argued that what characterizes thinking which is critical is the quality of the reasoning. Thus, in order to become a (more) critical thinker one must understand what constitutes quality reasoning, and have the commitments relevant to employing and seeking quality reasoning. The knowledge necessary for such understanding includes background knowledge relevant to the context in question, knowledge of the principles and standards of argumentation and inquiry, both in general and in specialized areas, knowledge of critical concepts, and knowledge of relevant strategies and heuristics. The kinds of habits of mind, commitments or sensitivities necessary for being a critical thinker include such things as open-mind- edness, fair-mindedness, the desire for truth, an inquiring attitude and a respect for high-quality products and performances. Thus, fostering criti- cal thinking would involve the development of such knowledge and commitments.
A variety of means may be employed to promote such development, including direct instruction, teacher modelling, creation of an educational environment where critical inquiry is valued and nurtured, and provision for students of frequent opportunities to think critically about meaningful
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challenges with appropriate feedback. Practice may also have a role to play, but it must be understood that it is not practice in the sense of a simple repetition of a skill, process or procedure. Rather such practice presupposes the kind of knowledge outlined above, and involves the development of critical judgement through applying this knowledge in avariety of contexts. It also involves attempts on the part of the learner to improve according to speci® c criteria of performance, and frequent feedback and evaluation with respect to the quality of thinking demonstrated.