Common misconceptions of critical thinking
SHARON BAILIN, ROLAND CASE, JERROLD R. COOMBS and LEROI B. DANIELS
In this paper, the ® rst of two, we analyse three widely-held conceptions of critical thinking: as one or more skills, as mental processes, and as sets of procedures. Each view is, we contend, wrong-headed, misleading or, at best, unhelpful. Some whowrite about critical thinking seem to muddle all three views in an unenlightening me lange. Apart from the errors or inadequacies of the conceptions themselves, they promote or abet misconceived practices for teaching critical thinking. Together, they have led to the view that critical thinking is best taught by practising it. We o€ er alternative proposals for the teaching of critical thinking.
Critical thinking is a subject of considerable current interest, both in terms of theory and pedagogy. A great deal is written about critical thinking, conferences on the subject abound, and educational initiatives aimed at fostering critical thinking proliferate.1 It is our view that much of the theoretical work and many of the pedagogical endeavours in this area are misdirected because they are based on faulty conceptions of critical think- ing. Critical thinking is frequently conceptualized in terms of skills, pro- cesses, procedures and practice. Much of the educational literature either refers to cognitive or thinking skills or equates critical thinking with certain mental processes or procedural moves that can be improved through practice. In this paper we attempt to explain the misconceptions inherent in such ways of conceptualizing critical thinking. It is important to note that much of the literature contains a pervasive miasma of overlapping uses of such terms as skill, process, procedure, behaviour, mental operations,
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Sharon Bailin, a professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6, is interested in philosophical inquiries into critical thinking, creativity and aesthetic education. Her publications include Reason and Values: New Essays in Philosophy of Education (Calgary, AB: Detselig, 1993), co-edited with John P. Portelli. Roland Case, an associate professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, conducts research in social studies and legal and global education. His most recent book is The Canadian Anthology of Social Studies: Issues and Strategies (Burnaby, BC: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University), co-edited with Penney Clark. Jerrold R. Coombs, a professor in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, has publishedextensivelyon ethical issues in education and the development of competence in practical reasoning. His publications include Applied Ethics: A Reader (Oxford: Black- well, 1993), co-edited with Earl R. Winkler. L eRoi B. Daniels, a professor emeritus in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, is interested in philosophy of mind and legal education. He is currently editing (with Roland Case) the `Critical Challenges Across the Curriculum’ series (Burnaby, BC: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University).
Journal of Curriculum Studies ISSN 0022± 0272 print/ISSN 1366± 5839 online Ñ 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/JNLS/cus.htm
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etc. We thus ® nd similar kinds of error and confusion about critical thinking under super® cially di€ erent ways of talking. We have tried to focus on plausibly distinct uses of skill, process and procedure in our critiques. Our arguments will lay the groundwork for o€ ering a new conception based on di€ erent foundational assumptions in the following paper on this theme.
Cri tic a l th in kin g a s ski l l
Many educators and theorists appear to view the task of teaching critical thinking as primarily a matter of developing thinking skills. Indeed, the discourse on thinking is su€ used with skill talk. Courses and conferences focus on the development of thinking skills and references to skills appear in much of the literature.2 Even leading theorists in the area of critical thinking conceptualize critical thinking largely in terms of skill. Thus, for example, Siegel (1988: 39, 41) writes of the critical thinker as possessing à certain character as well as certain skills’ , and makes reference to `a wide variety of reasoning skills’ . Similarly, Paul (1984: 5) refers to critical thinking skills and describes them as `a set of integrated macro-logical skills’ . The Delphi Report on critical thinking (Facione 1990), which purports tobe based on expert consensus in the ® eld, views critical thinking in terms of cognitive skills in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation and self-regulation.
It is important to note that the term s̀kill’ can be used in a variety of senses and that, as a consequence, some of the discussion of skills in critical thinking is relatively unproblematic. In some instances s̀kill’ is used to indicate that an individual is pro® cient at the task in question. It is used, in this context, in an achievement sense. A skilled reasoner is one who is able to reason well and to meet the relevant criteria for good reasoning. The use of skill in this context focuses attention on students being capable of intelligent performance as opposed to merely having propositional knowl- edge about intelligent performance. Thus, someone who is thinking criti- cally can do more than cite a de® nition for ad hominem. He or she will notice inappropriate appeals to an arguer’s character in particular argu- mentative contexts. Clearly, being a critical thinker involves, among other things, having a certain amount of `know-how’. Such thinkers are skilled, then, in the sense that they must be able to ful® ll relevant standards of good thinking. Conceptualizing critical thinking as involving skill in this achievement sense is relatively benign.
However, some of the discussion of skills in the context of critical thinking is more problematic. There is a strong tendency among educators to divide educational goals or objectives into three distinct kinds: knowl- edge, skills (i.e. abilities), and attitudes (i.e. values), and to assign critical thinking to the category of skills.3 Conceiving of critical thinking as a skill in this sense implies more than simply that an individual is a competent or pro® cient thinker. It is based on a conception of skill as an identi® able operation which is generic and discrete. There are di culties with both of these notions. We will begin with the problems entailed in viewing skills as
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generic, i.e. once learned, they can be applied in any ® eld of endeavour; the problems involved in viewing skills as discrete will be dealt with later.