Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Socrates. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? Euthyphro. No, that is the reason. Place Your Order Here!
Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? Read More »
education
what do you say of piety, Euthyphro; is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
Socrates. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro; is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? Euthyphro. Yes. Place Your Order Here!
Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? Socrates. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? Euthyphro. Yes. Socrates. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the
Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? Read More »
For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? Socrates. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For
Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?
Socrates. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? Euthyphro. True. Place Your Order Here!
Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
Socrates. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? Euthyphro. Yes. Place Your Order Here!
But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
Socrates. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? Euthyphro. No; they do not. Place Your Order Here!
did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off? Euthyphro. So I should suppose. Socrates. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action
how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety?
how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? Euthyphro. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me. Socrates. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking;
how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? Read More »
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act?
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Socrates. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Read More »