Are there alternative ways of considering it that are even more plausible and tenable?
ETHICS AND THE EXAMINED LIFE Á 15
write and add conflicting and even contradictory pas- sages in the same work. And like Socrates, he believed the search for truth was worth dying for.
The Socratic method forces people “to confront their own dogmatism,” according to Leonard Nelson, a German philosopher who wrote on such subjects as ethics and theory of knowledge until he was forced by the rise of Nazism to quit. By doing so, participants in Socratic dialogue are, in effect, “forcing themselves to be free,” Nelson maintains. But they’re not just confronted with their own dogmatism. In the course of a [Socratic dialogue], they may be confronted with an array of hypotheses, convictions, conjectures and theories offered by the other participants, and themselves—all of which subscribe to some sort of dogma. The Soc ratic method requires that—honestly and openly, rationally and imaginatively—they con- front the dogma by asking such questions as: What does this mean? What speaks for and against it? Are there alternative ways of considering it that are even more plausible and tenable?
At certain junctures of a Socratic dialogue, the “forcing” that this confrontation entails—the insis- tence that each participant carefully articulate her singular philosophical perspective—can be upsetting. But that is all to the good. If it never touches any nerves, if it doesn’t upset, if it doesn’t mentally and spiritually challenge and perplex, in a wonderful and exhilarating way, it is not Socratic dialogue. This “forcing” opens us up to the varieties of experiences of others—whether through direct dialogue, or through other means, like drama or books, or through a work of art or a dance. It compels us to explore alterna- tive perspectives, asking what might be said for or against each.
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Socrates’ method of examination can indeed be a vital part of existence, but I would not go so far as to say that it should be. And I do not think that Socrates felt that habitual use of this method “makes people happier.” The fulfillment that comes from Socratiz- ing comes only at a price—it could well make us unhappier, more uncertain, more troubled, as well as more fulfilled. It can leave us with a sense that we don’t know the answers after all, that we are much further from knowing the answers than we’d ever realized before engaging in Socratic discourse. And this is fulfilling—and exhilarating and humbling and perplexing.