And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admit- ted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?
Socrates. But what differences are there which can- not be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishon- ourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfac- torily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differ- ences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.
Socrates. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthy- phro, when they occur, are of a like nature?
Euthyphro. Certainly they are.
Socrates. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, hon- ourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now?
Euthyphro. You are quite right.
Socrates. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fight- ings among them.
Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?
* * *
Euthyphro. Piety . . . is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.
Socrates. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euthyphro. Of course.
Socrates. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hate- ful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?
Euthyphro. It was.
Socrates. And well said?
Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was cer- tainly said.
Socrates. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admit- ted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?
Euthyphro. Yes, that was also said.
Socrates. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. Or suppose that we differ about magni- tudes, do we not quickly end the differences by mea – suring?
Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?
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Euthyphro. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Socrates. But they join issue about the particulars— gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?