FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In foreign policy, Reagan sought a more assertive role for the nation, and Central America provided an early test . The United States pro- vided El Salvador with a program of economic aid and military training when a guerrilla insurgency threat- ened to topple its government . It also actively encouraged the transition to an elected democratic government, but efforts to curb active right-wing death squads were only partly suc- cessful . U .S . support helped stabi- lize the government, but the level of violence there remained undimin- ished . A peace agreement was finally reached in early 1992 .
U .S . policy toward Nicaragua was more controversial . In 1979
revolutionaries calling themselves Sandinistas overthrew the repres- sive right-wing Somoza regime and established a pro-Cuba, pro-Soviet dictatorship . Regional peace efforts ended in failure, and the focus of administration efforts shifted to support for the anti-Sandinista re- sistance, known as the contras .
Following intense political debate over this policy, Congress ended all military aid to the contras in Oc- tober 1984, then, under administra- tion pressure, reversed itself in the fall of 1986, and approved $100 mil- lion in military aid . However, a lack of success on the battlefield, charges of human rights abuses, and the rev- elation that funds from secret arms sales to Iran (see below) had been di- verted to the contras undercut con- gressional support to continue this aid .
Subsequently, the administration of President George H .W . Bush, who succeeded Reagan as president in 1989, abandoned any effort to secure military aid for the contras . The Bush administration also exerted pressure for free elections and supported an opposition political coalition, which won an astonishing upset election in February 1990, ousting the Sandini- stas from power .
The Reagan administration was more fortunate in witnessing a re- turn to democracy throughout the rest of Latin America, from Guate- mala to Argentina . The emergence of democratically elected governments was not limited to Latin America; in Asia, the “people power” campaign
of Corazon Aquino overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, and elections in South Korea ended decades of military rule .
By contrast, South Africa re- mained intransigent in the face of U .S . efforts to encourage an end to racial apartheid through the contro- versial policy of “constructive en- gagement,” quiet diplomacy coupled with public endorsement of reform . In 1986, frustrated at the lack of progress, the U .S . Congress overrode Reagan’s veto and imposed a set of economic sanctions on South Afri- ca . In February 1990, South African President F .W . de Klerk announced Nelson Mandela’s release and began the slow dismantling of apartheid .
Despite its outspoken anti-Com- munist rhetoric, the Reagan ad- ministration’s direct use of military force was restrained . On October 25, 1983, U .S . forces landed on the Ca- ribbean island of Grenada after an urgent appeal for help by neighbor- ing countries . The action followed the assassination of Grenada’s leftist prime minister by members of his own Marxist-oriented party . After a brief period of fighting, U .S . troops captured hundreds of Cuban mili- tary and construction personnel and seized caches of Soviet-supplied arms . In December 1983, the last American combat troops left Grena- da, which held democratic elections a year later .
The Middle East, however, presented a far more difficult situ- ation . A military presence in Leb- anon, where the United States was
CHAPTER 14: THE NEW CONSERVATISM AND A NEW WORLD ORDER
OUTLINE OF U.S. HISTORY
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attempting to bolster a weak, but moderate pro-Western government, ended tragically, when 241 U .S . Ma- rines were killed in a terrorist bomb- ing in October 1983 . In April 1986, U .S . Navy and Air Force planes struck targets in Tripoli and Beng- hazi, Libya, in retaliation for Libyan- instigated terrorist attacks on U .S . military personnel in Europe .
In the Persian Gulf, the earlier breakdown in U .S .-Iranian relations and the Iran-Iraq War set the stage for U .S . naval activities in the region . Initially, the United States responded to a request from Kuwait for pro- tection of its tanker fleet; but even- tually the United States, along with naval vessels from Western Europe, kept vital shipping lanes open by es- corting convoys of tankers and oth- er neutral vessels traveling up and down the Gulf .
In late 1986 Americans learned that the administration had secretly sold arms to Iran in an attempt to resume diplomatic relations with the hostile Islamic government and win freedom for American hostages held in Lebanon by radical organizations that Iran controlled . Investigation also revealed that funds from the arms sales had been diverted to the Nicaraguan contras during a period when Congress had prohibited such military aid .
The ensuing Iran-contra hearings before a joint House-Senate commit- tee examined issues of possible ille- gality as well as the broader question of defining American foreign poli- cy interests in the Middle East and
Central America . In a larger sense, the hearings were a constitutional debate about government secrecy and presidential versus congressio- nal authority in the conduct of for- eign relations . Unlike the celebrated Senate Watergate hearings 14 years earlier, they found no grounds for impeaching the president and could reach no definitive conclusion about these perennial issues .