Is it wrong to kill a person in self- defense?
Is Premise 1 true? It is at least dubious, because counterexamples abound in which the principle seems false. Is it wrong to kill one person to save a hundred? Is it wrong to kill a person in self- defense? Is it wrong to kill a person in wartime? As it stands, Premise 1 seems implausible.
To salvage the argument, we can revise Prem- ise 1 (as well as Premise 3) to try to make it imper- vious to counterexamples. We can change it like this:
1. Causing the death of a person who is incapac – itated is wrong.
2. Individuals in a deep, irreversible coma are persons.
3. “Pulling the plug” on someone in a deep, irreversible coma is causing an incapacitated person to die.
4. Therefore, “pulling the plug” on someone in a deep, irreversible coma is wrong.
Premise 1 now seems a bit more reasonable. In its current form, it rules out the counterexamples involving self-defense and war. But it does not escape the killing-to-save-lives counterexample. In some circumstances it may be morally permissible to kill someone to save many others, even if the person is incapacitated. To get around this problem, we can amend Premise 1 so the counterexample is no longer a threat (and make a corresponding change in the conclusion). For example:
1. Causing the death of a person who is incapac – itated is wrong, except to save lives.
2. Individuals in a deep, irreversible coma are persons.
3. “Pulling the plug” on someone in a deep, irreversible coma is causing an incapacitated person to die.
4. Therefore, “pulling the plug” on someone in a deep, irreversible coma is wrong, except to save lives.
Premise 1 now seems much closer to being cor- rect than before. It may not be flawless, but it is much improved. By considering counterexamples, we have made the whole argument better.
Checking a moral premise against possible counterexamples is a way to consult our consid- ered moral judgments, a topic we broached in Chapter 1 and take up again in Part 3 (Theories of Morality). If our considered moral judgments are at odds with a moral premise that is based on a cherished moral principle or moral theory, we may have a prima facie (at first sight) reason to doubt not only the premise but also the principle or theory from which it is derived. We may then need to reexamine the claims involved and how they are related. If we do, we may find that our judgments are on solid ground and the premise, principle, or theory needs to be adjusted—or vice versa. If our purpose is solely to evaluate a moral
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premise in an argument, we need not carry our investigation this far. But we should understand that widening our investigation may sometimes be appropriate and that our moral beliefs are often more interconnected than we might realize. Our ultimate goal should be to ensure that all our moral beliefs are as logically consistent as we can make them.