Emotivists also take an unusual position on moral disagreements.
They maintain that moral disagreements are not conflicts of beliefs, as is the case when one person asserts that something is the case and another person asserts that it is not the case. Instead, moral disagreements are disagree- ments in attitude. Jane has positive feelings or a favorable attitude toward abortion, but Ellen has negative feelings or an unfavorable attitude toward abortion. The disagreement is emotive, not cognitive. Jane may say “Abortion is right,” and Ellen may say “Abortion is wrong,” but they are not really disagreeing over the facts. They are expressing conflicting attitudes and trying to influence each other’s attitude and behavior.
Philosophers have criticized emotivism on several grounds, and this emotivist analysis of disagreement has been a prime target. As you might suspect, their concern is that this notion of disagree- ment is radically different from our ordinary view. Like subjective relativism, emotivism implies that disagreements in the usual sense are impossible. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. But we tend to think that when we disagree with someone on a moral issue, there really is a conflict of statements about what is the case. Of course, when we are involved in a con- flict of beliefs, we may also experience conflicting attitudes. But we do not think that we are only expe- riencing a disagreement in attitudes.